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1. Introduction  
    This paper examines the impact of CEOs who maintain high personal exposure to company-
specific risk on insurer’s risk-taking and firm performance in the U.S. property-liability insurance 
industry. Recently, a substantial body of literature on managerial overconfidence has focused 
attention on understanding important patterns of corporate decision-making that have not yet been 
fully explained by traditional finance theory (Skata, 2008). Existing empirical research has 
examined the important role of CEO overconfidence in a wide range of corporate decisions, such 
as risk taking (e.g., Sanders and Hambrick, 2007; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Hirshleifer et al., 
2012; Cain and McKeon, 2014). Specifically, the literature finds a positive relation between CEO 
overconfidence and risk-taking in non-financial industries.１    
Despite growing research, the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm performance 
relation remains ambiguous. CEO overconfidence may generate positive firm performance by 
leading risk-averse CEOs to take on sufficient risk (Goel and Thakor, 2008). On the other hand, 
CEO overconfidence can have a negative impact on firm performance due to value-destroying 
overinvestment (Malmendier and Tate, 2008).  
Prior literature has noted that one of the biggest challenges to the empirical analysis of 
managerial overconfidence is constructing proxies for unobservable CEO overconfidence, since 
overconfidence is a biased belief that cannot be easily measured (Baker et al., 2007). Although 
previous studies have employed different proxies for managerial overconfidence, the most 
commonly used measures of CEO overconfidence are the option holdings-based and the net stock 
purchase-based measures developed by Malmendier and Tate (2005). These two conventional 
                                                 
１The implication of these results is that companies should focus more on assessing the impact of managerial overconfidence on 
risk-taking in order to mitigate managers’ excessive risk-taking, and to steer managers toward optimal risk-taking (Goel and 
Thakor, 2008; Campbell et al., 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012).  
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overconfidence measures build upon the notion that overconfident CEOs are likely to maintain 
high levels of personal exposure to company-specific risk by delaying their option exercise and by 
purchasing more of their company’s stock since they are too optimistic about the firm’s prospects 
(Hirshleifer et al., 2012).  
In spite of the wide use of these measures, there have been several alternative explanations for 
the two CEO overconfidence measures. CEO’s late option exercise and additional stock purchase 
may be due to other factors, such as stock mispricing and growth opportunities (Cao, 2011) or 
inside information about the firm’s future stock prices (Bouwman, 2014). Thus, these proxies do 
not necessarily measure CEO overconfidence. 
In this study, we revisit the alternative explanations of these two conventional CEO 
overconfidence measures. We examine this issue by looking at the relationship between the two 
CEO overconfidence measures, risk-taking and firm performance in the U.S. property-liability 
insurance industry. We focus on the insurance industry because using reinsurance demand as a 
proxy for risk-taking enables us to directly observe CEO’s risk-taking behavior in insurance 
companies.２ Unlike the insurance industry, the risk-taking behavior of non-financial and banking 
industries cannot be measured directly. For example, the volatility of stock returns, which is a 
widely used measure of risk-taking in the prior literature, reflects more than just the risk-taking 
behavior of CEOs because stock returns reflect unexpected events and investors’ perception of the 
company. Thus, by investigating how CEOs who hold high levels of company-specific risk make 
reinsurance decisions, we can clearly see whether CEO’s late option exercise and buying more of 
their firm’s stock are really due to CEO overconfidence or to other causes.  
                                                 
２ Purchasing reinsurance is an important mechanism for insurers to limit their risk (Wang et al., 2008). 
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Our sample consists of 28 U.S. publicly traded property-liability insurance companies over the 
period 1996-2011.３ Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find that the two proxies 
for CEO overconfidence are negatively related to insurer’s risk-taking behavior, including total 
risk, underwriting risk, and leverage risk. More importantly, our evidence shows that the two CEO 
overconfidence measures are positively associated with insurer’s reinsurance demand, implying 
that overconfident CEOs ４  may purchase more reinsurance to protect themselves against 
unexpected losses, which could harm their job security as well as their personal portfolio. 
Specifically, we find that overconfident CEOs purchase more reinsurance than non-overconfident 
CEOs by 9.9 percent and 8.2 percent for the option holdings-based and the net stock purchase-
based measure, respectively. These results are different from those in previous studies (e.g., 
Banerjee et al., 2015) which find that firms with overconfident CEOs tend to display higher risk-
taking behavior.  
    For performance measures, the two proxies for CEO overconfidence are consistently found to 
be positively related to Tobin’s Q, return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and stock 
return. In addition, our evidence shows that CEOs classified as overconfident do earn positive 
abnormal stock returns and significantly increase their holdings of options and stock relative to 
non-overconfident CEOs.  
In summary, our overall results show that overconfident CEOs tend to take lower risk (such as 
purchasing more reinsurance and taking lower underwriting risk) and achieve higher firm 
performance. These results are different from the traditional finance paradigm: high risk and high 
                                                 
３ Due to the limited number of publicly traded property-liability insurance companies, our sample size is relatively small. The 
small sample size is common in the insurance literature studying publicly traded property-liability insurers (e.g., Eckles and Halek, 
2010; Huang et al., 2011; Miller, 2011; Ma and Wang, 2014).  
４ Hereafter, for simplicity, we use the term “overconfident CEOs” to refer to CEOs who hold significant firm-specific risk, as 
measured by late option exercise and habitual stock purchases. 
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expected return. One possible explanation of these results is that CEOs delay their option exercise 
and buy additional shares of their firm’s stock because they intend to benefit from future high 
stock prices by lowering their company’s risk and improving firm performance. The results imply 
that private information that CEOs can exploit for their personal profit may motivate them to 
maintain high personal exposure to company-specific risk.  
We also examine the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley Acts (SOX) and recent financial crisis on the 
relationship between two CEO overconfidence measures and insurer’s risk-taking behavior. With 
respect to the effect of SOX on the relation between the two proxies for CEO overconfidence and 
insurer’s risk-taking, we find mixed results. The results suggest that overconfident CEOs may 
reduce their firm’s total risk through management of underwriting, investment, and leverage risks 
that determine an insurer’s risk profile after SOX. We also find that the two CEO overconfidence 
measures are associated with lower risk-taking during the 2008-2009 financial crisis relative to the 
period before the crisis. 
This study potentially contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we provide the first 
empirical evidence on the alternative explanations of two conventional CEO overconfidence 
measures by investigating the impact of CEOs who maintain high personal exposure to the firm-
specific risk on risk-taking and firm performance in the insurance sector. Second, our study 
distinguishes itself from the previous literature by utilizing a direct measure of CEO’s risk-taking 
behavior. Unlike the prior literature in the non-financial and banking industries, we examine how 
overconfident CEOs affect insurer’s reinsurance, underwriting, investment, and leverage risk-
taking decisions over which CEOs of insurance companies have total or partial control. Previous 
studies mainly use market-based risk-taking measures, such as systematic risk, unsystematic risk 
and stock return volatility (e.g., Niu, 2010; Suntheim and Sirini, 2012; Banerjee et al., 2015). While 
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these risk measures reflect some aspects of firms’ risk-taking behavior, there are many other 
factors that impact these measures. For example, CEOs do not have total control over their firms’ 
stock returns. 
Third, since this study specifically focuses on the publicly traded property-liability insurance 
companies, we can efficiently control for a variety of potential omitted variables that may 
confound the interpretation of inter-industry studies. Fourth, this study explores the effects of 
major external shocks, such as SOX and financial crisis in 2008-2009 on managerial risk-taking. 
Thus, this paper helps enhance our understanding of how overconfident CEOs react to changes in 
the regulatory and economic environments.  
Finally, our overall findings indicate that overconfident CEOs may control the overall risk of 
the firm through lower underwriting and leverage risk-taking and increased use of reinsurance, 
achieving higher firm performance. The result suggests that it may not be CEO overconfidence, 
but rather the private information about the firm’s future stock prices and the intention to control 
the company’s risk that drives our results. Therefore, we cast doubt on whether the two 
conventional measures of CEO overconfidence really proxy for CEO overconfidence in U.S. 
property-liability insurance companies.  
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
alternative explanations of our CEO overconfidence measures, and formulates our main 
hypotheses. The data, sample selection criteria, and empirical methodology are discussed in 
Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes with a summary of our 
main findings.  
2.  Background and Hypotheses Development  
2.1. Alternative Explanations of CEO Overconfidence Measures 
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Over the last decade, managerial overconfidence has received much attention from scholars and 
practitioners alike, since this behavioral bias can have a pronounced influence on the firm 
(Hackbarth, 2008). CEO overconfidence is defined as the systematically upward biased beliefs of 
CEOs about the future returns to their investment projects or as the overestimation of the accuracy 
of their beliefs and underestimation of risks they are actually facing (Malmendier and Tate, 2005). 
The literature provides evidence that overconfident CEOs significantly affect corporate policies, 
including capital expenditures (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), mergers and acquisitions decisions 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2008), innovation (Hirshleifer et al., 2012), CEO turnover (Campbell et al., 
2011), earnings management (Schrand and Zechman, 2012), dividend policy (Deshmukh et al., 
2013), and corporate diversification (Andreou et al., 2016). 
Although prior literature has employed different proxies for managerial overconfidence５, the 
most commonly used measures for CEO overconfidence are the option holdings-based and the net 
stock purchase-based measures developed by Malmendier and Tate (2005). The main idea behind 
the two CEO overconfidence measures is based on CEOs’ late option exercise and additional stock 
purchases in spite of their high personal exposure to the firm’s idiosyncratic risk. Malmendier and 
Tate (2005) point out that rational CEOs are likely to exercise options early or minimize their 
holding of their company’s stock to address the under-diversification problem, whereas 
overconfident CEOs who are too optimistic about the outcomes of their decisions tend to do 
exactly the opposite in order to benefit from the expected future gains. These two overconfidence 
                                                 
５ Previous studies have used  a variety of  managerial overconfidence measures, such as the Longholder measure defined by the 
dummy variable that equals to one if the CEO ever held an option until the last year prior to expiration (Malmendier and Tate, 
2005; Malmendier et al., 2011), manager’s propensity to acquire companies (Doukas and Petzemas, 2007), manager’s status as an 
entrepreneur (Barros and Sylveira, 2007), a press-based measure (Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Hirshleifer et al., 2012), an 
overconfidence score based on CEOs’ prevalence in photographs in the annual report and their cash and non-cash pay relative to 
that of the second highest paid executive (Schrand and Zechman, 2012), a survey-based measure (Ben-David et al., 2013), and the 
fraction of a firm’s voluntarily earnings forecasts that exceeds the ex post realized earnings (Otto, 2014). 
 7 
 
measures have been widely used in many other studies (e.g., Campbell et al., 2011; Hirshleifer et 
al., 2012; Ahmed and Duellman, 2013; Banerjee et al., 2015; Hribar and Yang, 2015, Andreou et 
al., 2016; Ho et al., 2016).  
Despite their widespread use, there have been several alternative explanations for the two CEO 
overconfidence measures. First, CEOs may choose to delay the exercise of their highly in-the-
money options and to buy more of their company’s stock because they have positive private 
information about future stock prices. If private information is the true reason for CEO’s late option 
exercise or additional stock purchases instead of CEO overconfidence, the stock returns of firms 
with CEOs defined as overconfident using the two CEO overconfidence measures should be higher 
than the average stock market return.  
Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) rule out the possibility of inside information by 
demonstrating that, on average, CEOs who are classified as overconfident using the option 
holdings-based measure do not earn abnormal returns relative to the S&P 500 index. However, 
Bouwman (2014) examines the possibility that CEOs may exercise options late not because of 
optimism but because of favorable private information by dividing CEOs who are defined as 
optimistic using the option holdings-based measure (Holders 67)６ into those who made gains from 
exercising their options late and those who did not. He shows that 72.7 percent of Holders 67 
earned significantly positive abnormal returns relative to the S&P 500, suggesting that most of 
Holders 67 may actually be rational CEOs with favorable inside information rather than optimistic 
CEOs.  
Secondly, another reason why CEOs maintain high personal exposure to company-specific risk 
is to convey a costly signal to the capital market, indicating that their firms have better prospects 
                                                 
６ For a more detailed explanation on the option holdings-based overconfidence measure (Holder 67), see Section 3.3.1. 
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than other firms, in an attempt to reduce information asymmetries between the firm and the market. 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) state that signaling should reduce information asymmetries, thereby 
removing investment-cash flows sensitivity of CEOs who hold their options. They argue that high 
investment-cash flow sensitivity of overconfident CEOs dispels the possibility that option 
holdings-based measure is a proxy for signaling motives.  
Thirdly, CEOs may hold exercisable options too long because of their inertia or procrastination. 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) tease out the possibility of procrastination by showing that over 68 
percent of CEOs under the Longholder overconfidence measure conduct other transactions on their 
personal portfolios in the two years before their longheld options expire. Fourth, one may argue 
that risk-tolerant CEOs prefer to delay the exercise of their options, and thus appear to be 
overconfident. Malmendier and Tate (2005) contend that since less risk-averse managers are likely 
to leverage up the firm, lower risk aversion should lead to lower investment-cash flow sensitivity, 
which is inconsistent with the high investment-cash flow sensitivity of CEOs who hold deep in-
the-money options. Thus, they eliminate this alternative explanation. 
Fifth, Cao (2011) documents that if firms are overvalued or have better growth opportunities, 
CEOs tend to postpone their option exercise because they concern about the market’s negative 
reaction to CEO option exercise or want to profit from high growth potential. He argues that CEO’s 
late option exercise, which is closely related to stock mispricing and growth opportunities, may 
not be the appropriate proxy for CEO overconfidence. Lastly, overconfidence is considered to be 
stable and persistent trait over time (Hirshleifer et al., 2012). Bayat et al. (2016) provide evidence 
against the notion by showing that when CEOs switch firms, they tend to change their option 
excise decisions. They find that firm characteristics, such as firm’s growth potential, cash flow, 
cash holding, and leverage significantly affect CEOs’ decisions to hold or exercise their options, 
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thus questioning the validity of option holdings-based overconfidence measure. In summary, the 
above arguments and empirical findings cast some doubts on the argument that the two commonly 
used CEO overconfidence measures in the literature are good proxies for actual overconfidence.   
2.2. CEO Overconfidence and Risk Taking  
A firm’s risk-taking behavior has aroused considerable interest from academics and policy 
makers because it concerns the financial interests of various corporate stakeholders (Zou et al., 
2012). Managerial risk-taking is fundamental to corporate decision-making and has crucial 
implications for firm performance and survival (Boubakri et al., 2013). Financial scandals resulting 
from accounting fraud and earnings management in such large players as Enron, WorldCom and 
Adelphia illuminate the detrimental results of excessive risk-taking by top executives.  
Risk taking has been a main concern for the insurance sector where the protection of 
policyholders is always paramount among insurer’s priorities. In addition, excessive risk taking or 
a substantial loss variability caused by the environmental challenges, such as major natural 
disasters, may lead to a high likelihood of insurer insolvency (Ho et al., 2013). Since property-
liability insurers are mainly in the business of taking risk, we are interested in how overconfident 
CEOs affect insurer’s risk-taking behavior in the property-liability insurance industry.７ 
The literature shows that overconfident managers who expose themselves to a substantial degree 
of risk (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993) tend to overestimate the precision of exogenous noisy 
signals (Gervais et al., 2011), underestimate the riskiness of future cash flows (Hackbarth, 2008), 
and, therefore, undertake projects that are too risky (Malmendier and Tate, 2005).  
                                                 
７ We primarily focus on the CEO because CEO as an ultimate decision maker in his/her company is supposed to have some 
discretion on the firm’s risk-taking decisions (Suntheim and Sironi, 2012). 
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Previous studies find that CEO overconfidence defined using the option holdings-based or the 
net stock purchase-based measure is positively related to firm’s risk-taking in non-financial and 
banking firms.８ Hirshleifer et al. (2010) find that firms with overconfident CEOs tend to show 
higher stock return volatility. Cain and McKeon (2014) show that CEO overconfidence is 
positively associated with corporate risk taking. Niu (2010) reports that banks managed by 
overconfident CEOs tend to take greater risk. Suntheim and Sironi (2012) provide evidence that 
CEO overconfidence results in higher risk-taking and higher levels of fragility in the banking 
industry. Based on previous literature, we hypothesize that the two proxies of CEO overconfidence 
are positively related to risk-taking in the property-liability insurance industry. 
However, it is also possible for CEO’s late option exercise and additional stock purchases to be 
negatively associated with insurer’s risk-taking behavior. CEOs whose personal wealth and human 
capital are closely tied to their companies tend to be more risk-averse and to avoid risky investment 
in order to preserve their own personal portfolio (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Jensen et al. (2004) state 
that CEOs who are highly exposed to firm-specific risk may want to reduce the riskiness of their 
firms by underinvesting in risky projects and overinvesting in risk-reducing activities. Lewellen 
(2006) notes that CEOs with in-the-money options tend to take on less risk because in-the-money 
options make their portfolio more sensitive to stock price volatility, thus causing CEOs who hold 
undiversified portfolio to be more risk-averse. Also, high investment risk-taking can lead to a more 
volatile surplus and underwriting capacity, which may weaken the insurers’ ability to pay claims 
and may be detrimental to their survival (Zou et al., 2012).  
                                                 
８ Other risk-taking related literature includes Malmendier and Tate (2008), which demonstrates that overconfident CEOs are more 
prone to engage in riskier projects, such as value-destroying M&A activities, and Kim et al. (2015), which shows that firms with 
overconfident CEOs have higher stock price crash risk than firms with non-overconfident CEOs. 
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Thus, it is argued that CEOs who hold significant company-specific risk may reduce the 
company risk by adopting less risky underwriting policies, investing more in low risk projects, and 
choosing a lower level of leverage to protect their personal wealth. In light of above competing 
views, we suggest the following null hypothesis. 
     Hypothesis 1.1: The two proxies for CEO overconfidence are not related to risk-taking in   
                                property-liability insurance companies.９ 
Reinsurance has been widely used as an effective risk management and hedging tool against 
unexpected catastrophic losses in the property-liability insurance industry (Cummins and Weiss, 
2000).  As the insurance of insurers, reinsurance enables insurers to transfer risks among each 
other, enhancing the financial soundness of insurance companies. Thus, insurance companies 
optimally combine the use of capital and reinsurance to manage their risk (Yan and Hong, 2014).     
In addition, reinsurance companies play an important role in monitoring the primary insurers’ 
behavior, thereby mitigating insurer’s excessive risk-taking.  
While reinsurance has the advantage of improving insurer’s financial stability and reducing 
insolvency risk, it can also have a negative impact on firm performance because of the substantial 
cost of reinsurance.１０ Since both risk-taking and firm performance are important to managerial 
decision-making, CEOs need to make reinsurance decisions carefully.  
The relationship between CEO overconfidence measures and insurer’s reinsurance demand is 
unclear. Alsubaie (2009) points out that overconfident CEOs underestimate risk, and therefore 
they may engage in less hedging behavior than non-overconfident CEOs. In line with this argument, 
                                                 
９ Since the arguments for the different risk measures are similar, we generally use the term “risk-taking” to denote four different 
risk-taking measures: total risk, underwriting risk, investment risk, and leverage risk, in our hypothesis development. 
１０ Cummins et al. (2008) examine the effect of reinsurance purchase on the costs and the underwriting risk of 554 U.S. property-
liability insurers from 1995 to 2003. They find that the average quantity of reinsurance purchased from non-affiliated reinsurers is 
about $124 million/year, representing about 21 percent of total written premiums.  
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we predict that if overconfident CEOs who systematically overestimate the returns to their 
investment projects focus more on firm performance than on the riskiness of their firms, then they 
would prefer not to hedge risks by using reinsurance, and thus choose to purchase less reinsurance. 
In this case, the two proxies for CEO overconfidence would be negatively related to insurer’s 
reinsurance demand.  
On the other hand, CEOs who hold high levels of company-specific risk may reduce the 
riskiness of their firms by increasing the usage of reinsurance in order to protect themselves from 
unexpected losses that could be harmful to their job security as well as to their personal wealth. 
Thus, the relationship between the two proxies for CEO overconfidence and insurer’s reinsurance 
demand cannot be determined. These competing hypotheses lead to the following null hypothesis.     
 Hypothesis 1.2: The two proxies for CEO overconfidence are not related to reinsurance demand 
                       in property-liability insurance companies. 
 
 2.3. Effect of SOX on Relation between CEO Overconfidence and Risk Taking 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted in 2002 in response to a series of high profile 
corporate and accounting scandals. Since the enactment, SOX has dramatically changed the 
accounting profession and has affected all publicly traded companies in the U. S. The main purpose 
of SOX is to restrict managerial excesses, increase transparency, and improve corporate 
governance and ethical behavior by exposing CEOs to more personal liability (Banerjee et al., 
2015). Akhigbe et al. (2009) find that increased transparency and better disclosure after the 
introduction of SOX have reduced opacity in the insurance industry.  
However, despite extensive research, there is little agreement on the impact of SOX on CEO’s 
risk-taking behavior. Proponents of SOX argue that the stringent regulations on corporate 
governance, such as more independent boards, independent audit committees and mandated 
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disclosure may cause firms to engage in less risk-taking behavior. Cohen et al. (2007) note that 
increased legal and political exposure after SOX have resulted in a substantial decrease in the 
incentives of CEOs to invest in risky projects. Banerjee et al. (2015) demonstrate that after the 
passage of SOX, overconfident CEOs tend to reduce the level of risk exposure considerably. These 
arguments and empirical findings indicate that SOX may be effective in controlling CEO’s high 
risk-taking behavior when CEOs are overconfident.   
In contrast, opponents of SOX assert that SOX may not have a mitigating effect on managerial 
risk-taking. John et al. (2008) find that improved investor protection is positively related to higher 
managerial risk-taking. They point out that managers whose personal wealth is more closely tied 
to their firms have incentives to reduce firm-specific risk to protect their private benefits extracted 
from the corporation, but better investor protection can mitigate such behavior, resulting in higher 
corporate risk taking. Kim and Lu (2011) suggest that strong external governance holds CEOs 
accountable for firm performance by dampening the risk-reducing effect of CEO ownership. If 
that is the case, CEOs who hold under-diversified personal portfolio by delaying their option 
exercise and buying more of their company’s stock are expected to take on more risk after the 
enactment of SOX. Given the forgoing contradictory views, we suggest a null hypothesis about 
the effect of SOX on the relationship between two proxies for CEO overconfidence and risk-
taking.  
   Hypothesis 2: CEOs who maintain high personal exposure to company risk do not change their  
                          risk-taking behavior after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). 
2.4. Effect of Financial Crisis on Relation between CEO Overconfidence and Risk Taking 
    The financial crisis of 2008-2009 had a devastating impact on global economy, resulting in the 
collapse of a number of financial institutions and government bailouts of large financial 
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institutions. Recent studies show that firm’s risk management and financial policies had a 
significant influence on the degree to which firms were impacted by the financial crisis (e.g., 
Brunnermeier, 2009). Prior literature suggests that the financial crisis may have had different 
impacts on the relation between the two proxies for CEO overconfidence and risk-taking. 
On the one hand, CEOs’ late option exercise is expected to be positively associated with 
insurer’s risk-taking during the financial crisis. CEOs with stock options can increase their 
personal wealth when the stock price increases, and experience no reduction in their wealth when 
the stock price declines. This unlimited upside potential and zero downside risk of stock options 
may encourage managerial risk-taking behavior. Thus, we expect that CEOs who hold substantial 
amount of exercisable options would take higher risk during the financial crisis when they can 
inflate stock prices and cash out their options under uncertainty in the stock market. Luo and Song 
(2012) present evidence that CEO’s exercisable option holdings had a positive impact on a firm’s 
risk-taking during the financial crisis in the banking industry.  
On the other hand, increased stock ownership may lead CEOs whose personal wealth is closely 
linked to their firms to make conservative risk taking decisions during the financial crisis because 
CEOs who have high stock ownership can experience substantial losses in their personal wealth 
due to declining stock prices. Core et al. (2003) state that for risk-averse CEOs who hold company-
specific risk, large stock holdings may induce less risk-taking behavior. Kim and Lu (2011) point 
out that large stock ownership can discourage CEOs whose personal portfolios are less diversified 
from taking more risk. Gormley and Matsa (2016) reveal that managers who have a large 
ownership stake tend to reduce their firms’ stock volatility and risk of distress.  
We extend these arguments and argue that it is possible that CEOs who hold too much company-
specific risk may take on lower risk during the financial crisis, which is a high-risk period. As a 
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result, these different views of the impact of financial crisis on the relation between two 
overconfidence measures and insurer’s risk-taking lead to the following null hypothesis.  
  Hypothesis 3: CEOs who maintain high personal exposure to company risk do not change their  
                         risk-taking behavior during the period of financial crisis. 
2.5. CEO Overconfidence and Firm Performance 
      Existing studies provide mixed results for the effect of CEO overconfidence, defined by the 
two conventional CEO overconfidence measures, on firm performance. Several studies show that 
overconfident CEOs can reduce the value of the firm as a result of overinvestment (e.g., 
Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Campbell et al., 2011). Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that 
firms with overconfident CEOs who underestimate risk have lower firm performance because they 
tend to engage in more value-destroying mergers and acquisitions. Hackbarth (2009) contends that 
managerial overconfidence can lead to a higher probability of default, thereby resulting in high 
potential costs of financial distress. Chen et al. (2010) show that CEO overconfidence is associated 
with lower abnormal stock returns and operating performance.  
    On the contrary, Goel and Tate (2008) document that overconfident CEOs may increase firm 
value by mitigating the underinvestment problem. Hirshleifer et al. (2010) find no evidence that 
CEO overconfidence reduces firm performance as measured by sales, Tobin’s Q, and ROA. They 
argue that overconfident CEOs can help firms achieve greater innovative success, and do not 
necessarily harm firm value or profitability. Vitanova (2014) provides evidence that firms with 
overconfident CEOs achieve significantly higher firm performance than similar firms with non-
overconfident CEOs.  
In addition, CEOs may postpone the exercise of their highly in-the-money options or purchase 
more of their firm’s stock because of positive private information about future high stock prices. 
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If the alternative explanation for CEO overconfidence measures is valid, we expect a positive 
relationship between the two proxies for CEO overconfidence and firm performance. Based on the 
above discussions, we suggest our hypothesis 4 as the null form.  
     Hypothesis 4: The two proxies for CEO overconfidence are not related to firm performance     
                           in the property-liability insurance companies.１１ 
3. Data and Methodology 
This section discusses data and methodology. 
3.1. Data and Sample Selection 
Our sample includes data on 28 U.S. publicly-traded property-liability insurance companies 
over the period 1996-2011. We employ panel data that contain information both across firms and 
over time for each firm. Each of the variables for the analysis is calculated annually for the sample 
firms. Our data sources are described below. We use ExecuComp database to construct two proxies 
for CEO overconfidence. Monthly stock returns used to estimate buy-and-hold stock return are 
derived from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The data on Tobin’s Q are 
obtained from the Compustat database. We manually collect the data on corporate governance 
variables from SEC-filed annual proxy statements (DEF 14A) in the EDGAR database. The 
information about institutional ownership is extracted from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional 
Holdings (13F) database. 
All other insurance company-specific data are obtained from the annual statutory statements 
filed with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). We use 3-year rolling 
periods of data to compute three risk-taking measures, such as total risk (i.e., standard deviation 
                                                 
１１Since the arguments for the different performance measures are similar, we generally use the term “firm performance” to denote 
four different performance measures: Tobin’s Q, ROA, ROE, and stock return, in our hypothesis development. 
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of return on assets), underwriting risk (i.e., standard deviation of loss ratios) and investment risk 
(i.e., standard deviation of return on investment). For example, standard deviation of the return on 
assets (ROA) for 1996 is calculated using ROAs from 1996 to 1998.  
We initially obtained 3,589 executive-firm-year observations of option holdings and shares 
owned excluding options from the ExecuComp database for 52 U.S. publicly traded property-
liability insurance firms over the period 1996-2013. In calculating CEO overconfidence variables, 
we use the data only on option holdings and shares owned by CEOs, and exclude the data on option 
holdings and shares owned by other executives (i.e., option holdings and shares owned by CFO, 
president, vice-president and CEO of subsidiaries). Similar to Malmendier and Tate (2005), we 
require CEOs to have at least five years of data on option holdings and shares owned excluding 
options.  
These requirements reduce the sample size to 467 and 472 CEO-firm-year observations for 
option holdings and shares owned excluding options, respectively. Calculation of risk-taking 
measures requires 3 years rolling data, and thus, the most recent two years of data (2012-2013) are 
not included in our sample. After merging the data set used to construct the two proxies for CEO 
overconfidence with the data required to calculate risk-taking, firm performance and control 
variables, we have 233 and 235 CEO-firm-year observations for the option holdings-based 
measure and the net stock purchase-based measure, respectively, for 28 U.S. publicly traded 
property-liability insurance companies over the period 1996-2011.        
The ExecuComp database reports data on individual annual option holdings and shares owned 
excluding options for the CEO at the holding level, but the NAIC provides firm-specific as well 
as consolidated data for insurers that are comprised of multiple insurance companies. Since the 
CEO generally represents an entire insurance group, we use consolidated data for each insurance 
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group based on the aggregation of insurance companies within each group. A limitation of this 
study is the relatively small sample size, but this is a common concern of all insurance literature 
conducted with publicly traded property-liability insurers.１２ 
3.2. Methodology 
      We conduct regression analyses using a series of pooled, cross-sectional, and time-series data. 
The estimates of coefficients derived from OLS regression may be biased if there are some 
unknown variables or variables that cannot be controlled for that affect the dependent variable 
(Greene, 2011). To address this potential bias, we employ a two-way fixed effects model.１３ Given 
the cross-sectional and time-series data structure, the functional form of the two-way fixed effects 
model for the relationship between CEO overconfidence measures and insurer’s risk-taking has 
the following specification:   
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡= 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑧𝑧𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3  𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                           + 𝛼𝛼5 𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼6 𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛼𝛼7 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑧𝑧𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛼𝛼8 𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                  + 𝛼𝛼9 𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼10 𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  + 𝛼𝛼11 𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼12 𝑊𝑊𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 + 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
where i indexes the insurance company and t represents time (year), 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 is a vector of time fixed-
effects,  𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 is a vector of firm fixed-effects, and  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the error term. 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is one of several types 
of risk measures for an insurer i at time t. 
    For testing our hypothesis 1.2 and 4, we employ the lagged-structure model to correct for 
potential endogeneity problems, such as the reverse causality because the two measures of CEO 
                                                 
１２Eckles and Halek (2010) use 348 firm-year observations over the period 1992-2000. Eckles et al. (2011) have 213 firm-year 
observations from 1992 to 2000. Huang et al. (2011) use 224 firm-year observations for the period 2000-2007. Ma and Wang (2014) 
include 247 firm-year observations from 2006 to 2010.  
１３ We conduct the Hausman test of the null hypothesis that the firm-specific error term is uncorrelated with the residuals to 
determine which model to use between fixed effects or random effects. The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis for all the 
estimations, suggesting that fixed effects model fits the data better. 
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overconfidence are likely to be influenced by insurer’s reinsurance demand and firm performance. 
The regression models to test the relationship between two proxies for CEO overconfidence, 
reinsurance demand and firm performance can be expressed as follows:  
    𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1= 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑧𝑧𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3  𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                          + 𝛼𝛼5 𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼6 𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼7 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑧𝑧𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼 8𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                + 𝛼𝛼9 𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼10 𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼11 𝑊𝑊𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼12 𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                               + 𝛼𝛼13 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷_𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛼𝛼14 2𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂_𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅_𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 + 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
where  𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 is the reinsurance ratio for an insurer i at time t+1. 
 𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1= 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑧𝑧𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3  𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼4 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                         + 𝛼𝛼5 𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼6 𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼7 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑧𝑧𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼8 𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                            + 𝛼𝛼9  𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼10 𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼11 𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼12 𝑊𝑊𝑂𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡                                                                                                                                                                                                   + 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 + 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
where  𝑃𝑃𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 is one of several types of profitability measures for an insurer i at time 
t+1.  
The variables in the above equations are discussed next. 
3.3. Variable Definitions 
    The variables we describe in this section fall into four categories: CEO overconfidence 
measures, risk taking measures, firm performance measures, and control variables.  
3.3.1. CEO Overconfidence Measures 
CEO overconfidence is measured using two conventional proxies for CEO overconfidence, 
which are an option holdings-based measure of overconfidence (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005; 
Campbell et al., 2011; Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Ho et al., 2016) and a net stock purchase-based 
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measure of overconfidence (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Jarboui et al., 2014; Andreou et al., 
2016).  
As our first measure of CEO overconfidence, we employ an option holdings-based 
overconfidence measure using the information on CEO option holdings for U.S. publicly traded 
property-liability insurance companies.  Following Malmendier and Tate (2005)１４, we classify 
CEOs as overconfident if they keep their options too long to be considered rational. Specifically, 
the dummy variable (OC67) takes a value of one if a CEO postpones the exercise of his/her options 
that are 67 percent or more in the money at least twice over the sample period, and zero otherwise. 
We classify a CEO as overconfident from the first time he/she has exercisable options that are 67 
percent or more in the money.１５ Once a CEO is identified as overconfident, we assume that he/she 
remains overconfident for the rest of sample period because overconfidence is a persistent trait 
(Hirshleifer et al., 2012).  
Malmendier and Tate (2005) use very detailed data on option exercise to define overconfident 
CEOs. However, we cannot access the detailed data on CEO’s option holdings and exercise prices 
for each option grant as they do. Thus, we follow the method employed by Campbell et al. (2011) 
to compute the average moneyness of the CEO’s option portfolio for each year by using 
ExecuComp database. Campbell et al. (2011) demonstrate that this alternative measure is valid 
and useful in measuring CEO overconfidence.１６ To calculate the average moneyness, we first 
compute the average realizable value for the option by dividing the total realizable value of the 
                                                 
１４ Hall and Murphy (2002) assume that risk-averse executives generally hold undiversified portfolios and they should exercise 
options early if they are rational utility maximizers. In their numerical simulations, Hall and Murphy (2002) demonstrate that 
rational CEOs should exercise their options packages once their options are 67 percent in the money (i.e., stock price exceeds the 
exercise price by more than 67 percent) for each year of the stock option’s exercisability. Malmendier and Tate (2005) adopt this 
framework as a threshold level for CEO overconfidence. 
１５ We obtain similar results when we define CEOs who fail to exercise the options with 67 percent or more in the money at least 
twice as overconfident in all periods, not just starting from the first time they crossed the 67 percent threshold. 
１６ For a detailed discussion of the measure, see Campbell et al. (2011).  
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exercisable options (ExecuComp variable: OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL) by the number of 
exercisable options held by the CEO (ExecuComp variable: OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM) for each 
year. Next, we subtract the per-option average realizable value from the stock price at the fiscal 
year end (ExecuComp variable: PRCCF) to obtain an estimate of the average exercise price of the 
options (i.e., estimated strike price). Lastly, the average percent moneyness of the options equals 
the stock price at the fiscal year end (PRCCF) divided by the estimated strike price minus 1.  
Our second measure of CEO overconfidence is based on the tendency of CEOs to buy more of   
their firm’s stock despite their already high personal exposure to company-specific risk 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005). Malmendier and Tate (2005) contend that while rational CEOs tend 
to minimize the holding of their company’s stock in order to divest themselves of firm-specific 
risk, overconfident CEOs are likely to habitually increase their equity positions by purchasing new 
shares of their firm’s stock or accumulating new stock grants. Similar to Malmendier and Tate 
(2005), we define a CEO as overconfident if there are more years in which a CEO is a net buyer 
of their company’s stock than there are years in which a CEO is a net seller over the sample period.      
    Following the prior literature (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Jarboui et al., 2014), we require 
CEOs to have been in their position for at least 5 years to be included in our sample. To calculate 
the net stock purchase-based measure, we regard the increase (decrease) in shares owned by CEO 
in each year as the net amount of shares the CEO has bought (sold). Specifically, CEOs are 
classified as net buyers (net sellers) if the difference between the number of stocks held at current 
fiscal-year end and the number of stocks held at the prior fiscal-year end is positive (negative). 
Shares owned excluding options by CEO (ExecuComp variable: SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS) is 
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used to compute the overconfidence measure. We use a dummy variable (Net Buyer) that equals 
one if the CEO is a net buyer of company stock during the sample period, and zero otherwise.１７ 
3.3.2. Risk Taking Measures 
To investigate insurer’s risk-taking behavior in a comprehensive way, we employ a variety of 
risk-taking measures, such as reinsurance demand, total risk, underwriting risk, investment risk, 
and leverage risk.１８  Unlike the previous studies that typically use market-based risk-taking 
measures, we focus mainly on observable risky-taking behavior of CEOs by utilizing insurer’s 
reinsurance demand over which only CEOs of insurance companies have total control in order to 
directly examine whether two proxies for CEO overconfidence really measure overconfidence or 
not in the U.S property-liability insurance industry. First, we use insurer’s reinsurance demand as 
the most important risk measure in this study. Reinsurance is an important mechanism by which 
an insurer manages risk (Wang et al., 2008). We measure reinsurance demand as the ratio of 
reinsurance ceded to the sum of direct premiums written and reinsurance assumed (Klein et al., 
2002).  
Second, total risk is the overall risk for shareholders or policyholders, and reflects a combination 
of underwriting risk, leverage risk and investment risk (Ho et al., 2013). We measure total risk as 
the standard deviation of return on assets (ROA) where ROA is calculated as the ratio of net 
income plus taxes and interest expenses divided by net admitted assets.１９ Third, underwriting risk 
is especially important for insurers because it is closely associated with the uncertainty of 
                                                 
１７ Following, Andreou et al. (2016), we also classify CEOs as overconfident for their entire tenure if they are net buyer of their 
firm’s stock during their first five years. The results using this alternative measure are very similar to those reported. 
１８ Ho et al. (2013) point out that using different risk measures is better than using one risk measure in the examination of insurer’s 
risk-taking behavior. 
１９ Admitted assets are the assets permitted by state laws to be included in an insurer’s financial statement in determining the 
solvency of insurers. Admitted assets typically exclude illiquid and hard-to-value assets, such as overdue receivables and furniture 
and equipment. 
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insurance contract losses.２０ Underwriting risk is measured by the standard deviation of the firm’s 
loss ratio where the loss ratio is the ratio of loss incurred divided by premiums earned. 
Fourth, investment risk is related to the investment activities that may adversely affect insurer’s 
financial stability. Since underwriting profit could be negative in many instances,２１ effectively 
taking and managing investment risk are essential to success of insurance companies (Hoyt and 
Trieschmann, 1991). We measure investment risk by using the standard deviation of return on 
investment (ROI) where ROI is measured by the ratio of net investment gain divided by investment 
assets. Finally, leverage risk is crucial to insurers because an insurance company having a 
relatively lower level of surplus is more likely to become insolvent than a firm with a high level 
of surplus.２２ Leverage risk is computed as 1 minus the surplus-to-asset ratio.   
3.3.3. Performance Measures 
The key performance measures used in this study are identified from the literature. We first 
employ Tobin’s Q as a market-based measure of firm performance. Tobin’s Q is a widely used 
measure in the prior literature on the relationship between CEO overconfidence and firm 
performance (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Hirshleifer et al., 2010; Vitanova, 2014). Brainard 
and Tobin (1968) define Tobin’s Q as the market value of equities to the replacement costs of the 
physical assets. However, since it is difficult to measure replacement costs of the physical assets 
due to data limitations, previous studies have used book value of assets instead of replacement 
costs in calculating Tobin’s Q. In this study, we compute Tobin’s Q by dividing market value of 
assets by the book value of assets where market value of assets is estimated as the total assets plus 
                                                 
２０ Browne and Hoyt (1995) find that high underwriting risk has a negative influence on insurer’s financial stability in the U.S. 
property-liability insurance industry. 
２１ According to a report by Insurance Information Institute (I.I.I), between 1980 and 2013, underwriting income for the U.S. 
property-casualty industry has been net positive in only five years.   
２２ Carson and Hoyt (1995) provide evidence that insurers with low levels of leverage tend to have a lower likelihood of insolvency.                                                                                                                              
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market value of equity minus book value of equity. Market value of equity is calculated by 
multiplying the number of common shares outstanding by stock price at fiscal year end. Following 
Daniel and Titman (1997), we estimate book value of equity as stockholder’s equity + deferred 
taxes + investment tax credit – preferred stock.  
Following the prior literature (e.g., Elango et al., 2008; Shim, 2011; Huang et al., 2013), we also 
use various accounting and market-value measures of profitability, such as return on assets (ROA), 
return on equity (ROE) and stock return as proxy measures of the insurer’s performance. We define 
ROA as the ratio of net income plus taxes and interest expenses to net admitted assets. ROE is 
computed by dividing net income plus taxes and interest expenses by insurer’s equity capital. Stock 
return is the annual buy-and-hold stock return as measured by compounding monthly stock returns 
over the fiscal year.  
3.3.4. Control Variables  
We include corporate governance variables as explanatory variables in the regression analysis 
because the extant literature suggests that corporate governance structure may affect the insurer’s 
reinsurance demand, risk-taking behavior, and firm performance (e.g., Garven and Lamm-
Tennant, 2003; Brick and Chidambaran, 2008; Cheng, 2008). Board size is the number of all 
directors (Bsize). Insider percentage is the percentage of executive directors on the board (Insider). 
We define a busy board with the dummy variable (Busy) that takes the value of one if 50 percent 
or more independent board members hold three or more directorships, and zero otherwise. CEO 
duality is a dummy variable (Duality) that equals one if the same person is the CEO and 
Chairperson of the board, and zero otherwise. Institutional ownership is measured as the 
percentage of shares held by institutional investors (Institution).  
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In addition, we use several firm characteristics as control variables. The natural logarithm of 
total net written premiums is used as a proxy for firm size (Size). Lines of business Herfindahl 
index is calculated as the sum of the squares of the percentages of direct premium written across 
product lines (ProdHHI).２３ Geographical Herfindahl index is computed by the sum of the squares 
of the percentages of direct premium written across 50 states for each insurer (GeoHHI). The 
percentage of long-tail lines is defined as the ratio of premiums of long-tail lines to total net written 
premiums (Longtail).２４ Insurer financial condition is an indicator variable (Weak) that takes a 
value of one if the insurer is financially unhealthy, where unhealthy is defined as more than four 
unusual Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS) ratios,２５ and zero otherwise.  
Prior literature has documented a variety of factors affecting insurer’s reinsurance demand. 
Thus, we use additional control variables, such as tax effect, coastal states, and 2 year loss 
development in the regressions where reinsurance demand is a dependent variable. Tax effect is a 
proxy for the tax liability or tax-favored assets (Tax). We measure tax effect as the ratio of tax-
exempt investment income relative to total investment income (Wang et al., 2008). Coastal States 
is a dummy variable (Coastal_State) that takes value of one if the insurer is domiciled in a 
hurricane-prone state (Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia), and zero 
otherwise. 2 year Loss Development (2year_Loss_Dev) is computed by dividing the developed 
                                                 
２３ We include approximately 30 different lines of business in calculating the lines of business Herfindahl index. The percentage 
of lines of business is obtained from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ (NAIC) annual statutory filings. 
２４ Long-tail lines are lines of business for which losses may not be known for some period, and it takes a long period of time for 
the claims to be settled (e.g., general liability, directors and officers liability (D&O), and workers’ compensation). 
２５ The Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS) is a set of financial ratios used by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC) to assess insurer’s financial soundness. If an insurer has more than three unusual ratios outside of the usual 
range set by the NAIC, it may receive more intense regulatory intervention. 
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reserve for the reserve of two years ago (i.e., managements’ currently revised estimate of the 
reserve of two years ago) minus the reserve reported two years ago by policyholders’ surplus of 
two years ago (Petroni, 1992).２６ The definitions of all variables are summarized in Appendix 1.  
4. Results  
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables. The results of OC67 and Net buyer 
measures show that about 59 percent and 72 percent of CEO-firm-years are defined as 
overconfident, respectively. These percentages are comparable with those in prior studies using 
similar measures for CEO overconfidence.２７ Table 2 provides the Pearson correlation coefficients 
between all independent variables. The correlation coefficient between two different proxies for 
CEO overconfidence measures is 0.083, which is very similar to that of 0.063 in Malmendier and 
Tate (2005). Table 2 also shows that some independent variables are highly correlated. For 
example, the correlation coefficients on reinsurance and firm size, line of business Herfindahl 
index and 2 year loss development, and board size and geographical Herfindahl index are -0.491, 
-0.457 and -0.547, respectively, and are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. We perform 
the variance inflation factor (VIF) test to check for multicollinearity among independent variables 
in the regression design. We find that VIFs of all independent variables in the regressions are less 
than 4 and thus, conclude that multicollinearity does not adversely affect our regression results.  
4.2. Empirical Results 
                                                 
２６ U.S. Property-liability insurers are required to report originally estimated losses and loss expenses as well as revised estimate 
(or development) of those values based on subsequent experience in later years to state insurance commissioners in Schedule P of 
insurers’ financial statement filings following the Statutory Accounting Principles (SAP).  
２７ Malmendier and Tate (2005) classify 51 percent and 61 percent of CEO-years as overconfident for the option holdings-based 
and the net stock purchase-based measure, respectively. 
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    The estimates of the parameters from our two-way fixed effects regression of the relationship 
between two CEO overconfidence measures and risk-taking are presented in Table 3. We first 
report the results of the reinsurance demand model. The coefficients on both proxies for CEO 
overconfidence are positively significant in reinsurance demand at the 1 percent and 5 percent 
level for the option holdings-based and the net stock purchase-based measure, respectively. These 
results imply that overconfident CEOs may increase the usage of reinsurance in order to protect 
themselves against unexpected losses that could harm their job security as well as their personal 
wealth.  
As for the control variables, we find a negative relationship between firm size and insurer’s 
reinsurance demand, implying that small insurance firms are more likely to purchase reinsurance 
as a way to manage unexpected losses (Mayers and Smith, 1990). Both product and geographic 
concentration are significantly and positively related to reinsurance demand. The results indicate 
that insurers with a higher concentration in a given line of business or geographic area may have 
a higher incentive to purchase more reinsurance in order to diversify the risks associated with the 
concentrations (Cole and McCullough, 2006).  
The coefficients of the percentage of long-tail lines are significantly negative, consistent with 
Altuntas et al. (2015) that insurers with a higher percentage of long-tailed line business typically 
hold large reserves compared with premiums, and thus less reinsurance may be required to cover 
future claim payments. Weak is positively related to reinsurance demand, implying that financially 
weak insurers purchase more reinsurance to reduce insolvency risk. Tax is not significantly related 
to reinsurance demand, consistent with Garven and Lamm-Tennant (2003). The coefficient on 2 
year loss development is positively significant, implying that firms that underreport their loss 
reserves tend to purchase higher levels of reinsurance (Cole and McCullough, 2006).  
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The results of the risk taking models (total risk, underwriting risk, investment risk, and leverage 
risk) in Table 3 are discussed next. The evidence shows that the coefficients on CEO 
overconfidence variable are negative and significant in total risk, underwriting risk, and leverage 
risk for both the option holdings-based and the net stock purchase-based measures. However, we 
do not find any significant relations between CEO overconfidence and investment risk for both 
overconfidence measures. The results imply that overconfident CEOs take lower total risk, 
underwriting risk and leverage risk relative to non-overconfident CEOs by 4.8 percent, 2.0 percent 
and 3.2 percent, respectively, for the option holdings-based measure, and by 3.4 percent, 4.9 
percent and 3.3 percent, respectively, for the net stock purchase-based measure.  
Some possible explanations for these results are provided below. In terms of the negative 
relationship between CEO overconfidence measures and underwriting risk, CEOs who hold firm-
specific risk may not want to harm their company’s underwriting profits by taking on more risk in 
underwriting activities because high underwriting risk may result in high losses. High losses could 
have a harmful effect on the profitability of the firm, thereby increasing the concerns on their 
career and personal wealth. The negative relationship between CEO overconfidence measures and 
leverage risk could be explained by the fact that CEOs who maintain high personal exposure to 
company-specific risk may prefer to take lower levels of corporate leverage to avoid high financial 
risk in their personal portfolio.２８ Considering that total risk is a combination of underwriting risk, 
investment risk, and leverage risk (Ho et al. 2013), it seems reasonable to have the negative 
relationship between CEO overconfidence measures and total risk.  
The findings together with the positive relation between CEO overconfidence measures and 
insurer’s reinsurance demand imply that overconfident CEOs try to limit their risk exposures to 
                                                 
２８ High leverage risk results in high probability of financial distress or bankruptcy in the insurance sector (Carson and Hoyt, 1995). 
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protect their wealth. This result is consistent with the finding of Lewellen (2006) that if CEOs are 
not well diversified, in-the-money options discourage them from taking risks. Also, the result 
supports the “playing it safe” hypothesis (Gormley and Matsa, 2016) that managers who hold a 
large ownership stake tend to undertake less risk than desired by a diversified shareholder because 
their personal wealth is closely related to firm’s performance.  
   With regard to the control variables for all risk taking models, only the important results are 
discussed to save space. The evidence in Table 3 shows that board size is negatively and 
significantly related to total risk and leverage risk, indicating that the performance of firms with 
large boards may be less volatile because the decisions made by large boards tend to be less 
extreme (Cheng, 2008). Firm size is found to be positively related to total risk and leverage risk, 
implying that larger insurers tend to take more risk. We also find that the coefficients on the 
product concentration are significant and positive in total risk and underwriting risk, whereas the 
coefficients on geographical concentration are negatively significant in all four risk measures. The 
results indicate that insurers with higher concentrations in a given line of business exhibit greater 
risk-taking behavior, and that operating over wider geographical areas may expose insurers to 
greater risk because the complexity of diversified firms increases the difficulty of monitoring 
managers’ excessive risk-taking.  
The results in Table 4 show that the implementation of SOX has different impacts on managerial 
risk-taking behavior. We find that interaction term SOX × OC67 is significantly positively related 
to reinsurance demand, and the coefficients on the interaction term are significant and negative in 
total risk, underwriting risk and leverage risk. The coefficients on SOX × Net buyer are negative 
and statistically significant in underwriting risk and leverage risk. These results support the view 
that SOX may have a mitigating effect on overconfident CEO’s risk-taking behavior (Banerjee et 
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al., 2015). We also find that the interaction terms of SOX × OC67 and SOX × Net buyer are 
positively and significantly related to investment risk, implying that overconfident CEOs tend to 
take on higher investment risk after the enactment of SOX. One possible explanation for these 
mixed results is that overconfident CEOs may choose higher investment risk, but lower 
underwriting risk and leverage risk as its strategy to control the firm’s total risk through 
management of underwriting, investment, and leverage risks that determine an insurer’s risk 
profile.２９ 
We next examine the effect of the recent financial crisis on the relationship between CEO 
overconfidence and insurer’s risk-taking. The dependent variable is the change in risk-taking 
before and during the financial crisis as measured by the average of 2008-2009 risk-taking 
measures minus the average of 2005-2006 risk-taking measures, and CEO overconfidence 
measures and control variables of 2007 are used as independent variables. Table 5 reports that the 
coefficients on OC67 are significant and negative in total risk, investment risk, and leverage risk, 
implying that CEOs who postpone their exercisable options tend to take on lower risk during the 
financial crisis relative to the before crisis period. We also find that the signs on Net buyer are 
significantly negative in total risk and leverage risk. These results indicate that CEOs who hold 
high levels of firm-specific risk reduce the riskiness of their firms during the financial crisis in an 
effort to protect their own personal wealth.  
Table 6 presents the estimations of the parameters of the relationship between CEO 
overconfidence measures and firm performance. The coefficients on CEO overconfidence 
measured by both OC67 and Net Buyer are significant and positive in all four profitability 
measures, implying that insurers with overconfident CEOs tend to achieve better financial 
                                                 
２９ Please see Ho et al. (2013). It should be noted that they examine insurers’ risk-taking behavior, while this study investigates 
CEOs’ risk-taking behavior.   
 31 
 
performance. The results, together with the negative relation between CEO overconfidence 
measures and risk-taking, suggest that overconfident CEOs improve their personal wealth as a 
result of both higher firm performance and lower risk.  
There are some interesting results with respect to several control variables. Table 6 reports that 
a busy board is positively related to firm performance, implying that busy directors help firms 
improve performance by bringing in more experience and knowledge (Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015). 
Institutional ownership is found to have a positive impact on firm performance, suggesting that 
monitoring by institutional investors helps managers focus more on firm’s performance and less 
on opportunistic behaviors (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999).  
We also find that firm size is positively associated with firm performance. This result implies 
that large insurers may achieve higher performance due to economies of scale. Reinsurance 
demand is negatively related to insurer’s financial performance, consistent with the finding of Lee 
and Lee (2012) that insurers with higher reinsurance ratios tend to have lower firm performance. 
We find that product and geographical concentration are positively associated with firm 
performance, indicating that focused insurers tend to have greater financial performance. Lastly, 
insurer’s financial weakness is found to be negatively related to firm performance.  
4.3. CEO Overconfidence or Private Information 
    Prior literature suggests that CEOs may decide not to reduce their personal exposure to firm-
specific risk because they have private information about future stock prices, thereby keeping their 
exercisable options longer and increasing their equity holdings (e.g., Bouwman, 2014). In order to 
examine this possibility, we calculate the average abnormal stock returns for the firms with 
overconfident or non-overconfident CEOs by using the Fama-French (1993) three-factor and the 
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Carhart (1997) four-factor models.３０ We measure the monthly abnormal returns of firms with 
overconfident CEOs for 60-month period,３１ starting from the first year when CEO are classified 
as overconfident. Also, we perform the same analysis for non-overconfident CEO firms over the 
same period and compare abnormal returns between overconfident-CEO firms and non-
overconfident-CEO firms. To estimate the monthly abnormal returns (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ), we employ the 
following equation based on the Fama-French three-factor model: 
                 𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 −  𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 �𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 −  𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡� +  𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 +  ℎ𝑖𝑖  𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,  
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the stock return on an equal- or a value-weighted portfolio of firms with overconfident 
or non-overconfident CEOs in month t. 𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 is the 1-month treasury bill return, 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 is the CRSP 
value-weighted market index return, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 is the difference in the returns on the value weighted 
portfolios of small and big stocks, 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 is the difference in the returns on the value weighted 
portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks.     
    For the Carhart four-factor model, we use the following equation:  
              𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 −  𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 �𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 −  𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡� +  𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 +  ℎ𝑖𝑖  𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,   
where 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡  is the difference in the return on the value weighted portfolios of high and low 
momentum stocks. Table 7 presents the abnormal stock returns of firms with overconfident or non-
overconfident CEOs. Panel A of Table 7 shows the results of the option holdings-based measure. 
We find that the monthly abnormal returns of overconfident CEOs are significantly positive at the 
                                                 
３０ See Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) for a more detailed explanation on these methods. The data on 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡,  𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡, SMB, 
HML, UMD are taken from Kenneth French’s web page (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/fa/faculty/ken.french/data 
library.html). 
３１ We also estimate the abnormal stock returns by using the 12- and 36- month periods. The results are very similar to those for 
60-month period.  
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1 percent level for equal- and value-weighted portfolios in both the Fama-French three-factor 
model (0.6 percent and 0.6 percent) and the Carhart four-factor model (0.7 percent and 0.8 
percent). For the non-overconfident CEOs, the abnormal returns are not significantly different 
from zero for equal- and value-weighted portfolios under both models. The return differentials 
between two CEO groups are positively significant for the equal- and value-weight portfolios in 
both the Fama-French three-factor and the Carhart four-factor models.  
   We also find similar results for the net stock purchase-based measure. As reported in Panel B of 
Table 7, for both the Fama-French three-factor and the Carhart four-factor models, the average 
monthly abnormal stock returns for equal- and value-weighted portfolios of overconfident CEOs 
are significantly positive, and those returns for equal- and value-weighted cases of non-
overconfident CEOs are not statistically significant in both models. The return differentials 
between overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs are significant and positive in all cases. These 
results are consistent with the finding of Bouwman (2014) that CEOs who postpone exercising 
their highly-in-the-money options may be rational CEOs with favorable inside information about 
the future stock prices rather than optimistic CEOs.３２ 
Furthermore, we compute the average of insurer’s reinsurance demand for overconfident CEOs 
for each five-year window, starting from the first year when they hold options at least 67 percent 
in the money or the first year when they are net buyers of their firm’s stock. For non-overconfident 
CEOs, we calculate the average reinsurance demand over the same period. The results in Table 8 
show that overconfident CEOs purchase more reinsurance than their non-overconfident 
                                                 
３２ We also calculate the average of annual buy-and-hold stock returns of firms with overconfident or non-overconfident CEOs for 
a five-year period, beginning from the first year of holding options at least 67 percent in the money or the first year of being a net 
buyer of their firm’s stock. The results show that on average, the returns of overconfident CEOs do beat those of non-overconfident 
CEOs by 13 percent and 7 percent for the option holdings-based and the net stock purchase-based measure, respectively, and the 
return differentials are statistically significant. 
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counterparts by 9.9 percent and 8.2 percent for the option holdings-based (OC67) and the net stock 
purchase-based measure (Net Buyer 50), respectively, and the differentials in reinsurance demand 
between overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs are significantly positive. To check the 
robustness of these results, we perform the same test for CEOs who hold options at least 75 percent 
in the money (OC75) or are net buyers of their company’s stock over at least 80 percent of years 
that they are in the CEO position (Net Buyer 80). We find that these CEOs purchase more 
reinsurance relative to those who hold options at least 67 percent in the money and are net buyers 
in more than 50 percent of the sample period and the differences in reinsurance demand between 
two CEO groups for OC75 and Net Buyer 80 (13 percent and 12.2 percent) are larger than 
differences for OC67 and Net Buyer 50 (9.9 percent and 8.2 percent). The results indicate that 
when overconfident CEOs hold more options and buy more of their firm’s stock, they tend to 
purchase more reinsurance. 
Overall, these results imply that CEOs who maintain high exposure to firm-specific risk intend 
to lower their company’s risk by purchasing more reinsurance in order to maximize benefits from 
future high stock prices, suggesting that private information instead of CEO overconfidence may 
motivate CEOs to hold their deep-in-the-money options and to buy more of their company’s stock 
in U.S. property-liability insurance companies. 
4.4. Trends in CEO Option Holdings and Stock Ownership 
    Our empirical results indicate that CEOs who delay their option exercise and purchase more 
of their firm’s stock tend to reduce risk-taking to maximize benefits from private information. 
Alternative explanations for lower risk taking behavior of overconfident CEOs are that in-the-
money options and a large stock ownership may cause CEOs who hold firm-specific risk to be 
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more risk-averse, thereby discouraging them from taking risks (e.g., Lewellen, 2006; Gormley and 
Matsa, 2016).  
To rule out these alternative explanations, we examine whether CEOs increase (or decrease) 
their option holdings and/or stock ownership after being defined as overconfident. If CEOs who 
are classified as overconfident continue to increase the number of unexercised but exercisable 
stock options or their holdings of company’s stock, it would support our argument that CEOs who 
maintain high exposure to firm-specific risk may actually be rational CEOs with private 
information and tease out the alternative explanations for low risk-taking tendencies of risk-averse 
CEOs who hold in-the-money options and large holdings of equity. 
To do so, we first examine whether CEOs defined as overconfident increase (or decrease) their 
option holdings or stock ownership３３ for each five-year period, beginning from the first year when 
they hold at least 67 percent in-the-money options or the first year when they are net buyer of their 
company’s stock. We find that almost all CEOs defined as overconfident increase their holdings 
of options and stock over a 5-year interval.３４ Specifically, 19 out of 19 overconfident CEOs 
(option holdings-based measure) and 21 out of 22 overconfident CEOs (net stock purchase-based 
measure) increase the number of vested but unexercised options and the number of holdings of 
their firm’s stock over a five-year interval. Also, we compute the average percentage changes in 
CEO option holdings and stock ownership for three different time intervals (one-year, three-year 
and five-year period following the first year when CEO are classified as overconfident). Table 9 
                                                 
３３ We exclude shares acquired on option exercise (ExecuComp item: OPT_EXER_NUM) and restricted stocks (ExecuComp item: 
SHRS_UNVEST_NUM) from shares owned excluding options (ExecuComp item: SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS) to only examine the 
increase in CEO stock holdings due to stock purchase from the open market. 
３４ Especially, we find that overconfident CEOs keep increasing the number of option holdings and stock ownership every year for 
16 out of 19 CEOs (option holdings-based measure) and for 18 out of 22 CEOs (net stock purchase-based measure). For non-
overconfident CEOs, only 7 out of 15 and 5 out of 12 CEOs increase their holdings of options and stock over the same five-year 
interval for the option holdings-based and the net stock purchase-based measure, respectively. 
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report the results. The mean percentage changes in the number of vested but unexercised options 
for overconfident CEOs defined using option holdings-based (net stock purchase-based measure) 
are 52 percent (61 percent), 82 percent (94 percent), and 124 percent (132 percent) for one-year, 
three-year and five-year period, respectively.  
For non-overconfident CEOs, the corresponding mean percentage increases are 23 percent (26 
percent), 32 percent (39 percent), and 57 percent (61 percent) for the option holdings-based (net 
stock purchase-based measure) in three different time periods. The differences in means across 
two CEO groups are huge (as high as 66 percent and 70 percent for the option holdings-based and 
the net stock purchase-based measure, respectively) and statistically significant for all cases. In 
summary, the increasing trends of option holdings and stock ownership by CEOs defined as 
overconfident suggest that private information instead of overconfidence may motivate these 
CEOs to expose themselves more to firm-specific risk and to reduce risk-taking behavior, giving 
support to our previous results.  
4.5. Robustness Check and Additional Tests 
In this section, we report the results of a series of robustness checks of our main findings. First, 
CEO’s late option exercise or additional stock purchase behavior may be jointly determined with 
firm’s risk-taking behavior, and thus the feedback effect between dependent and independent 
variables may violate the consistency of the OLS estimator, leading to the problem of endogeneity. 
For example, boards of insurance companies that want to maintain lower levels of firm risk might 
take CEO’s willingness to tie their personal wealth to performance of the firm into account when 
selecting a CEO because they recognize that these CEOs tend to reduce the riskiness of firm in 
order to protect their own portfolio.  
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Thus, we conduct a further robustness check with the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method to 
determine whether our regression results are robust to endogeneity. In the 2SLS model, we treat 
CEO overconfidence variables as endogenous variables for which we use instrumental variables 
that are correlated with the two proxies for CEO overconfidence, but are uncorrelated with the 
error term of the regression. The lagged or historically averaged measures of firm characteristics, 
industry growth, and general economic growth are commonly used instrumental variables (Campa 
and Kedia, 2002). Also, prior literature (e.g., Ho et al., 2016) uses the age of the CEO as an 
instrument of CEO overconfidence. Therefore, we initially employ 3-year average of firm size, 3-
year average of industry premium growth rate, 3-year average of real GDP growth, CEO age, and 
lagged values of the firm characteristics included in our regressions as the potential instrumental 
variables for the two CEO overconfidence variables. Our test results show that only 3-year average 
firm size and 3-year average of real GDP growth fulfill the two requirements.３５ 
The estimated results using 2SLS are presented in Table 10. The coefficients on CEO 
overconfidence measures are positively significant in reinsurance demand, and negatively 
significant in total risk, underwriting risk, and leverage risk for the net stock purchase-based 
measure. For the option holdings-based measure, we find similar results, except for leverage risk. 
Thus, we conclude that our findings are robust to the endogeneity issue. Although not reported 
here,３６ the results of the effect of SOX and the financial crisis on the relation between the two 
proxies for CEO overconfidence and insurer’s risk taking confirm our previous findings. 
                                                 
３５  To check whether our instrumental variables satisfy the two conditions mentioned above, we use an F-test of the joint 
significance of the excluded instruments and Hansen’s J test of over-identifying restrictions to examine whether the instruments 
are valid, and are uncorrelated with the error term, respectively. We find that the F-test of excluded instruments rejects the null 
hypothesis of weak instruments at the 1 percent level (the p-value is 0.0001), and Hansen’s J test does not reject the null hypothesis 
that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term (the p-value is 0.2571), indicating that our two instrumental variables (3-
year average firm size and 3-year average of real GDP growth) are valid. 
３６ Untabulated results are not reported to preserve space. The authors would be happy to provide the results upon request. 
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 Second, we examine the robustness of our results to an alternative risk-taking measure by using 
the Z-score as a proxy for the insurer insolvency risk. The Z-score is inversely related to the 
likelihood of insolvency, with a higher Z-score indicating a lower probability of default (Boyd and 
Runkle, 1993). Z-score is calculated by dividing the sum of ROA and capital to asset ratio by the 
standard deviation of ROA. In untabulated results, we find that both CEO overconfidence 
measures are significantly positively related to the Z-score, implying that overconfident CEOs tend 
to achieve higher financial stability, consistent with our previous findings that CEO who hold their 
options longer and buy more of their firm’s stock tend to take lower risk.  
Third, Andreou et al. (2016) point out that changes in the shares owned by CEOs may be driven 
not only by stocks that CEOs purchase from the open market but also by stocks that CEOs retain 
after exercising their vested options. Ofek and Yermack (2000) show that managers tend to sell 
almost all stocks acquired through the exercise of vested options. Thus, if we do not exclude the 
changes in the stock ownership due to the exercise of vested stock options, we may incorrectly 
attribute increase in CEO stock holdings caused by the exercise of vested options to 
overconfidence. We address this concern by using an alternative net stock purchased-based 
measure based on CEO’s open market stock purchases. Following Andreou et al. (2016), we 
redefine the net buyer measure after subtracting the number of shares acquired on option exercise 
(ExecuComp item: OPT_EXER_NUM) from shares owned excluding options (ExecuComp item: 
SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS). We find that our main results are robust to using the alternative net 
buyer measure of overconfidence (untabulated). 
    Fourth, our sample period, ending in 2011, was characterized much more heavily by stock grants 
as firms moved away from option-based compensation in favor of restricted share grants. Thus, 
our net stock purchased-based measure may be problematic, considering the recent trends of 
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increases in CEO shareholdings due to stock grants. This could explain why 72 percent of all 
observations are categorized as overconfident based on this measure. To address this issue, we 
remove the number of restricted stocks outstanding at the end of each year (ExecuComp item: 
SHRS_UNVEST_NUM) from shares owned excluding options (ExecuComp item: 
SHROWN_EXCL_OPTS). Untabulated results show that our main findings remain the same for 
the exclusion of restricted stock grants. 
    Fifth, Kim and Lu (2011) find that large stock ownership can discourage CEOs who are highly 
exposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their company from taking more risk. It is possible that CEOs 
who delay their option exercise and buy additional shares of their firm’s stock could also have a 
high level of stock ownership, and thus the negative relationship between two CEO overconfidence 
measures and risk-taking may be due to CEOs’ large holdings of equity that lead them to reduce 
the riskiness of their firms in an effort to protect their personal portfolio.  
    To disentangle wealth effects of CEO ownership, we rerun the regressions in Table 3 by adding 
CEO equity ownership (as measured by the proportion of the number of shares owned by CEO) 
as an additional control variable. The results are reported in Table 11. The coefficients of CEO 
ownership are positively significant in reinsurance demand, and negatively significant in total risk, 
underwriting risk, investment risk and leverage risk. These results are consistent with the “playing 
it safe” hypothesis (Gormley and Matsa, 2016) that managers whose personal wealth is closely 
linked to their firm tend to take on less risk or undertake value-destroying actions that reduce the 
firm’s risk. More importantly, we find that the negative relationship between CEO overconfidence 
measures and insurer’s risk-taking is still present after controlling for CEO equity ownership. 
Thus, we conclude that our main findings are robust to the wealth effects from CEO’s stock 
holdings. 
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Sixth, the prior literature has shown that executive compensation is closely linked to the 
insurer’s risk-taking behavior (Downs and Sommer, 1999; Eckles and Halek, 2010; Ma and Wang, 
2014). Thus, we include several variables capturing different aspects of CEO compensation, such 
as bonus, long-term incentive pay, stock options awarded, stock options exercised, and restricted 
stock as control variables in the regressions in order to control for the impact of CEO compensation 
on insurer’s risk-taking. All variables are scaled by total compensation. Untabulated results show 
that our main results remain consistent and robust when we control for CEO compensation 
variables.  
Seventh, the result in Table 2 shows that the correlation coefficient between two CEO 
overconfidence measures is slightly weak (0.083). Although we find consistent results for both 
overconfidence measures, it might be interesting to examine whether we could obtain the same 
results for intersection of two overconfidence measures (i.e., CEOs are defined as overconfident 
if they not only hold highly-in-the-money options but also habitually purchase their company’s 
stock) to check the robustness of our results. We find that the new measure based on the 
intersection of two overconfidence measures is positively related to reinsurance demand and 
negatively associated with risk-taking (untabulated), thus confirming our previous results. As a 
last robustness check, we use A.M. Best ratings as an additional explanatory variable because 
credit rating could have a significant impact on corporate risk-taking decisions (Graham and 
Harvey, 2001). Again, we find that our results remain robust (untabulated). 
5. Conclusion 
Despite their prominence, alternative explanations have been suggested for the two conventional 
CEO overconfidence measures. This study revisits this issue by examining the impact of CEOs 
who maintain high personal exposure to company-specific risk on insurer’s risk-taking behavior 
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and firm performance in U.S. publicly traded property-liability insurance companies. We focus on 
the insurance industry because of the availability of more accurate measurement of CEO’s risk-
taking behavior:  insurer’s reinsurance demand. 
Interestingly, we find that the two CEO overconfidence measures are positively related to 
insurer’s reinsurance demand and negatively associated with insurer’s risk-taking, including total 
risk, underwriting risk, and leverage risk. We also find a positive relationship between the two 
proxies for CEO overconfidence and firm performance, indicating that overconfident CEOs may 
lead to greater firm profitability and higher stock returns.  
The evidence shows that overconfident CEOs earn positive abnormal returns, significantly 
increase their holdings of options and stock, and purchase more reinsurance relative to non-
overconfident CEOs. In addition, we find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to hold 
exercisable options and keep purchasing stocks in the five-year period after they are classified as 
overconfident than non-overconfident CEOs. 
Taken together, our overall results suggest that CEOs defined as overconfident try to control the 
overall risk of the firm through increased use of reinsurance and lower underwriting and leverage 
risk-taking, achieving higher firm performance. One possible explanation for the results is that it 
is not CEO overconfidence but the private information or the intention to control the company’s 
risk that drives our results. Therefore, we cast doubt on whether the two conventional measures of 
CEO overconfidence really proxy for CEO overconfidence in U.S. property-liability insurance 
companies. In addition, our findings are not unique to the insurance industry.３７ Our results are 
robust to the endogeneity issue, using the Z-score as a proxy for the insurer insolvency risk, using 
                                                 
３７ See Appendix for the results of the relation between CEO overconfidence measures and risk-taking across different industries.  
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the alternative overconfidence measures, and adding CEO ownership, executive compensation and 
A.M. Best ratings as control variables.  
Appendix      
    Prior literature in banking and non-financial industries has provided evidence that CEO 
overconfidence defined using the option holdings-based or the net stock purchase-based measure 
is positively associated with corporate risk taking. Thus, we examine the relationship between two 
proxies for CEO overconfidence and risk-taking, using market-based risk measures. Following 
Banerjee et al. (2015), we employ three market-based risk-taking measures, such as stock return 
volatility (i.e., total risk), systematic risk (i.e., exposure to market risk) and unsystematic risk (i.e., 
firm-specific risk). We measure stock return volatility by calculating the standard deviation of 
daily stock returns. To measure systematic risk, we estimate the annual beta (β) by using daily 
stock return data for each firm. We employ the following a single-index market model to estimate 
the beta for each insurer i in each year t. 
                                                      𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  = α + β𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 +µ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡     
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  is the daily return on the insurer’s stock, 𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡  is the daily return on the CRSP equal 
weighted index, and µit is the error term. In addition, we compute the mean squared error (MSE) 
from the estimation of the single index model over the year to measure unsystematic risk. We take 
a natural logarithm of MSE to mitigate concerns about skewness.  
    To gain a deeper understanding of risk-taking of CEOs who hold firm-specific risk, we 
investigate the relation between CEO overconfidence measures and risk-taking across different 
industries. To do so, we first classify firms into 48 industry groups based on the Fama and French 
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(1997) categories and then estimate separate regressions for each of the 48 industries.３８ The 
results show that the relationship between CEO overconfidence variables and risk-taking varies 
across industries (not tabulated).  
    Specifically, we find that the coefficients of CEO overconfidence are significant and positive in 
only 21 (23) out of 48 industries for the option holdings-based (net stock purchase-based measure) 
in at least one of the three market-based risk measures. And the coefficients are either not 
statistically significant or significantly negative in 27 (25) industries in at least one of the three 
risk measures for the option holdings-based (net stock purchase-based measure).３９ These findings 
indicate that lower risk-taking of overconfident CEOs is not unique to the insurance industry, 
suggesting that the validity of two conventional CEO overconfidence measures is not very robust. 
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition   
 
CEO Overconfidence 
 
 
OC67 
 
  
Dummy is 1 if CEO holds unexercised excisable options that are 67 percent 
or more in the money at least twice over the period, and zero otherwise. CEO 
is defined as overconfident from the first moment they hold unexercised 
exercisable options that are at least 67 percent in the money 
 
 
 
 
Net Buyer  Dummy is 1 if years of change in shares owned > 0 is greater than years of  
 change in shares owned < 0, and zero otherwise 
 
Risk Taking  
 
 
Reinsurance Demand 
 
 
Total Risk 
 
  Ratio of reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premiums written            
   and reinsurance assumed  
 
  Standard deviation of return on assets (ROA) 
 
          
 
Underwriting Risk Standard deviation of the firm’s loss ratio  
 
Investment Risk 
 
Standard deviation of return on investment (ROI) 
 
Leverage Risk 
 
 
  1 minus the surplus-to asset ratio 
 
 
Firm Performance  
 
Tobin’s Q                                       
                                                        
                                                                                                               
                                           
 
 
 
 (AT + ME – BE) / AT 
 
   AT: total assets 
   ME: market value at year-end 
   BE: book value of equity (Following Daniel and Titman, 1997) 
   BE = (Stockholder’s equity + Deferred taxes + Investment Tax Credit      
             – Preferred Stock) 
  ROA 
 
   Ratio of net income plus taxes and interest expenses to net admitted assets 
  ROE  
 
   Ratio of net income plus taxes and interest expenses to the insurer’s  
   equity capital 
 Stock return   
 
 Buy-and-hold return from compounding monthly stock returns over the  
 fiscal year 
           48 
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Variable Definition 
 
Corporate Governance 
 
Bsize 
 
 
 
Number of all directors 
Insider Percentage of executive directors on the board 
Busy 
 
Dummy is 1 if 50 percent or more independent board members hold 
three or more directorships, and zero otherwise 
Duality 
 
Dummy is 1 if the same person is the CEO and Chairperson, and 
zero otherwise 
Institution Percentage of shares held by institutional investors 
CEO Ownership Proportion of the number of shares owned by CEO 
 
Firm characteristics 
 
Size Natural log of total net written premiums 
ProdHHI Sum of the squares of the percentages of direct premium written across 
product lines 
GeoHHI Sum of the squares of the percentages of direct premium written 
across 50 states  
Longtail Premiums of long-tail lines divided by total net written premiums 
Weak 
 
Dummy is 1 if insurer has more than four unusual Insurance 
Regulatory Information System (IRIS) ratios, and zero otherwise 
 
Tax 
 
Ratio of tax-exempt investment income to total investment income 
Coastal_state Dummy is 1 if the insurer is domiciled in a hurricane-prone state 
(Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, 
Vermont, and Virginia), and zero otherwise 
 
2 year_loss_Dev 
 
The developed reserve for the reserve of two years ago (i.e., 
managements’ currently revised estimate of the reserve of two years 
ago) minus the reserve reported two years ago divided by 
policyholders’ surplus of two years ago  
  
Appendix 1. (Continued) 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
 
Variables                      N Mean         Median       Std. Dev         Min          Max 
       
CEO Overconfidence              
OC67       233 0.588 1.000 0.493 0.000 1.000 
Net Buyer       235 0.719 1.000 0.450 0.000 1.000 
Risk Taking 
 
          
Reinsurance Demand     235 0.206 0.108 0.234 0.000 1.000 
Total Risk       235 0.033 0.022 0.062 0.003 0.575 
Underwritng Risk       235 0.063 0.052 0.043 0.008 0.261 
Investment Risk       235 0.022 0.008 0.084 0.001 0.752 
Leverage Risk       235 0.662 0.685 0.126 0.049 0.827 
Performance 
 
                             
Tobin’s Q                                        232    1.066 1.073 0.188 0.335 2.149 
ROA       235    0.038 0.037 0.028 -0.064 0.126 
ROE       235    0.117 0.113 0.091 -0.257 0.541 
Stock Return       232    0.118 0.093 0.266 -0.568 1.261 
Corporate Governance 
 
      
    
Bsize       235 10.617  11.000 2.260 5.000 17.000 
Insider       235 0.165 0.133 0.083 0.063 0.445 
Busy        235 0.268 0.000 0.443 0.000 1.000 
Duality       235 0.689 1.000 0.464 0.000 1.000 
Institution       229 0.726 0.737 0.162 0.326 1.000 
CEO Ownership        232 0.035 0.014 0.057 0.000 0.383 
Control Variables 
 
          
Size       234 20.832 20.550 1.828 12.391 24.008 
ProdHHI       231 0.330 0.242 0.263 0.093 1.000 
GeoHHI       230 0.195 0.070 0.271 0.038 1.000 
Longtail       229 0.772 0.774 0.143 0.261 1.000 
Weak       235 0.022 0.000 0.147 0.000 1.000 
Tax       235 0.461 0.445 0.246 -0.504 1.059 
Coastal_state       231 0.560 1.000 0.498 0.000 1.000 
2year_Loss_Dev       225 -0.037 -0.044 0.133 -0.455 0.554 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 
 
                         
1.   OC67 1                         
 
2.   Net Buyer 
 
 0.083 
 0.022 
1   
                     
3.   Reinsurance  0.196 
 0.004 
 0.082 
 0.230 1                       
4.   Total Risk    -0.042 
 0.538 
-0.205 
 0.002 
0.260 
<0.0001 1                      
5.   Underwriting Risk -0.379 
 <0.0001 
-0.147 
 0.029 
0.151 
0.026 
 0.368 
<0.0001 1                     
6.   Investment  Risk -0.017 
 0.806 
-0.192 
 0.004 
0.276 
<0.0001 
 0.577 
<0.0001 
 0.261 
<0.0001 1                    
7.   Leverage Risk -0.007 
 0.914 
-0.048 
 0.480 
-0.352 
<0.0001 
-0.019 
 0.782 
-0.075 
 0.267 
 0.013 
 0.850 1                   
8.   Tobins’s Q  0.207 
 0.002 
 0.040 
 0.559 
-0.163 
 0.017 
-0.125 
 0.069 
-0.090 
 0.185 
-0.172 
 0.011 
 0.057 
 0.396 1                  
9.   ROA  0.030 
 0.662 
 0.001 
 0.924 
-0.352 
<0.0001 
-0.044 
 0.516 
0.124 
 0.068 
-0.116 
 0.086 
-0.076 
 0.263 
0.298 
<0.0001 1                 
10. ROE  0.068 
 0.321 
 0.016 
 0.813 
-0.387 
<0.0001 
-0.039 
 0.571 
 0.117 
 0.084 
-0.104 
 0.126 
 0.200 
 0.003 
0.343 
<0.0001 
 0.815 
<0.0001 1                
11. Return  0.191 
 0.015 
 0.025 
 0.750 
 0.015 
 0.848 
 0.014  
 0.859 
-0.039 
 0.619 
 0.008 
 0.917 
 0.120 
 0.128 
0.314 
<0.0001 
 0.003 
 0.971 
 0.047 
 0.553 1               
12. Bsize -0.147 
 0.029 
 0.262 
<0.0001 
-0.030 
 0.664 
-0.034 
 0.616 
-0.227 
 0.001 
 0.023 
 0.732 
 0.064 
 0.341 
 -0.045 
0.511 
-0.134 
 0.048 
-0.068 
 0.317 
-0.070 
 0.372 1              
13. Insider  0.138 
    0.040 
 -0.020 
   0.762 
 0.105 
 0.125 
 0.032 
 0.639 
 0.100 
 0.140 
 0.030 
 0.654 
-0.312 
<0.0001 
0.113 
0.094 
 0.107 
 0.115 
 0.054 
 0.424 
 0.058 
 0.465 
0.301 
<0.0001 1             
14. Busy -0.196 
 0.003 
 0.091 
 0.175 
-0.316 
<0.0001 
-0.070 
 0.298 
-0.062 
 0.362 
-0.107 
 0.113 
 0.125 
 0.067 
0.273 
<0.0001 
 0.136 
 0.045 
 0.170 
 0.012 
 0.059 
 0.457 
0.061 
0.366 
-0.311 
<0.0001 1            
15.Duality -0.160 
 0.017 
-0.149 
 0.027 
-0.462 
<0.0001 
-0.182 
 0.007 
-0.186 
 0.006 
-0.161 
 0.017 
 0.401 
<0.0001 
-0.126 
 0.069 
 0.051 
 0.451 
 0.143 
 0.035 
 0.051 
 0.518 
-0.038 
 0.578 
-0.142 
 0.034 
 0.119 
 0.077 1           
16. Institution  0.094 
 0.190 
 0.133 
 0.063 
 0.002 
 0.977 
 0.073 
 0.310 
 0.165 
 0.021 
-0.121 
 0.092 
 0.333 
<0.0001 
-0.013 
 0.856 
 0.159 
 0.028 
 0.190 
 0.008 
-0.022 
 0.794 
-0.238 
 0.001 
-0.125 
 0.082 
 0.072 
 0.315 
0.117 
0.102 1          
17. CEO Ownership  0.177 
 0.008 
 0.262 
<0.0001 
 0.099 
 0.146 
-0.047 
 0.488 
-0.104 
0.012 
-0.006 
 0.931 
  -0.019 
 0.008 
 0.112 
 0.073 
 0.101 
 0.133 
 0.098 
 0.147 
 0.155 
 0.048 
-0.139 
 0.039 
0.299 
<0.0001 
-0.177 
 0.008 
0.175 
0.010 
 -0.165 
 0.020 1         
18. Size -0.089 
 0.190 
 0.233 
 0.001 
-0.491 
<0.0001 
-0.113 
 0.097 
-0.311 
<0.0001 
-0.128 
 0.060 
 0.407 
<0.0001 
 0.188 
 0.006 
 0.174 
 0.010 
 0.264 
<0.0001 
 0.044 
 0.577 
 0.364 
<0.0001 
-0.393 
<0.0001 
 0.472 
<0.0001 
0.346 
<0.0001 
 0.009 
 0.904 
0.126 
0.062 1        
19. ProdHHI -0.172 
 0.012 
-0.087 
 0.206 
-0.321 
<0.0001 
 0.029 
 0.669 
 0.301 
<0.0001 
-0.013 
 0.849 
 0.040 
 0.558 
 0.185 
 0.007 
 0.196 
 0.004 
 0.258 
 0.000 
-0.066 
 0.411 
-0.361 
<0.0001 
 0.196 
 0.004 
-0.024 
 0.725 
-0.043 
 0.535 
 0.109 
 0.135 
 -0.049 
0.473 
-0.268 
<0.0001 1       
20. GeoHHI -0.156 
 0.022 
-0.307 
<0.0001 
 0.031 
 0.654 
 0.017 
 0.808 
 0.156 
 0.022 
-0.039 
 0.575 
-0.376 
<0.0001 
-0.052 
 0.451 
 0.095 
 0.167 
 0.053 
 0.442 
-0.010 
 0.903 
-0.547 
<0.0001 
 0.296 
<0.0001 
 0.130 
 0.057 
-0.010 
 0.885 
-0.236 
 0.001 
-0.065 
0.344 
-0.395 
<0.0001 
 0.300 
<0.0001 1      
21. Longtail -0.347 
 <0.0001 
-0.238 
 0.001 
-0.205 
 0.003 
-0.028 
 0.685 
 0.180 
 0.008 
-0.003 
 0.968 
 0.440 
<0.0001 
-0.096 
 0.163 
 0.020 
 0.771 
 0.158 
 0.020 
-0.035 
 0.664 
-0.066 
 0.334 
 0.070 
 0.308 
-0.125 
 0.066 
 0.172 
 0.011 
 0.165 
 0.023 
0.224 
0.000 
-0.047 
 0.497 
 0.456 
<0.0001 
-0.065 
 0.348 1     
22. Weak -0.129 
 0.057 
-0.108 
 0.103 
 0.003 
 0.962 
 0.013 
 0.846 
 0.169 
 0.012 
 0.026 
 0.705 
 0.078 
 0.248 
-0.070 
 0.301 
-0.069 
 0.312 
-0.030 
 0.658 
-0.007 
 0.932 
-0.065 
 0.337 
-0.014 
 0.838 
-0.053 
 0.429 
 0.062 
 0.354 
-0.069 
 0.338 
0.095 
0.158 
-0.038 
 0.578 
 0.096 
 0.161 
-0.003 
 0.964 
 0.159 
 0.020 1    
23. Tax -0.149 
 0.027 
 0.050 
 0.460 
 0.005 
 0.923 
-0.103 
 0.127 
 0.030 
 0.652 
-0.087 
 0.195 
-0.289 
<0.0001 
-0.094 
 0.167 
 0.285 
<0.0001 
 0.201 
 0.003 
 0.022 
 0.778 
 0.115 
 0.088 
-0.032 
 0.640 
 0.174 
 0.009 
-0.024 
 0.718 
-0.342 
<0.0001 
0.002 
0.473 
 0.129 
 0.057 
-0.122 
 0.075 
 0.037 
 0.590 
-0.025 
 0.713 
 0.144 
 0.032 1   
24. Coast_state  0.164 
 0.016 
 0.058 
 0.390 
 0.268 
<0.0001 
 0.042 
 0.541 
-0.213 
 0.002 
 0.086 
 0.204 
 0.109 
 0.105 
-0.098 
 0.152 
-0.151 
 0.027 
-0.072 
 0.290 
 0.060 
 0.449 
-0.129 
 0.057 
 0.349 
<0.0001 
-0.078 
 0.253 
 0.010 
 0.887 
 0.202 
 0.005 
 -0.069 
0.315 
-0.226 
 0.001 
-0.088 
 0.197 
 0.175 
 0.010 
 0.249 
 0.002 
-0.089 
 0.190 
-0.020 
 0.765 1  
25. 2year_loss_Dev  0.014 
 0.844 
-0.182 
 0.008 
 0.206 
 0.003 
 0.086 
 0.214 
 0.172 
 0.012 
 0.068 
 0.321 
 0.170 
 0.013 
 0.051 
 0.460 
-0.234 
 0.001 
-0.197 
 0.004 
 0.176 
 0.028 
-0.058 
 0.411 
-0.050 
 0.466 
-0.108 
 0.117 
 0.023 
 0.734 
-0.095 
 0.190 
0.160 
0.019 
 0.040 
 0.564 
-0.457 
<0.0001 
-0.081 
 0.242 
-0.027 
 0.699 
  0.295 
<0.0001 
0.039 
0.574 
-0.057 
 0.409 1 
Note: The table presents the Pearson correlation matrix for all variables. See Table 1 for variable definitions.   
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Table 3. Regression Results of Risk Taking on CEO Overconfidence Measures  
 
Note: The table reports the results of two-way fixed effects regressions. See Table 1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
within-panel serial correlation. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.  
Dependent Variable:       Reinsurance Demand              Total Risk    Underwriting Risk  Investment Risk                Leverage Risk 
  
 
OC67 
(1) 
   Net Buyer  
     (2) 
 OC67 
  (1) 
Net Buyer  
    (2) 
 
 
  OC67 
    (1) 
Net Buyer  
     (2) 
 OC67 
   (1) 
 Net Buyer  
     (2) 
 
 
OC67 
  (1) 
       Net Buyer  
          (2) 
 
Intercept 
 
     3.561***   
    (0.000) 
    
  3.612*** 
 (0.000) 
 
      0.042** 
     (0.039) 
 
  0.012*** 
 (0.000) 
   
  0.081** 
 (0.046) 
 
     0.082** 
    (0.042) 
 
 
   
     -0.312      
     (0.241) 
 
 -0.208** 
  (0.038) 
 
   -1.595*** 
    (0.000) 
 
 -1.704*** 
 (0.000) 
OC67(1)      0.053*** 
    (0.000) 
    
 
     -0.048*** 
     (0.007) 
   
 
 -0.020** 
 (0.041) 
  
 
     -0.024 
     (0.298) 
      
 
   -0.032*** 
    (0.001) 
   
Net Buyer(2)    
 
  0.045** 
 (0.034) 
 
 
 -0.034*** 
 (0.000) 
   
 
 -0.049** 
 (0.025) 
 
 
   
 
          -0.008 
          (0.126) 
      
 
 -0.033*** 
  (0.000) 
Bsize 
 
    -0.001 
    (0.853) 
 -0.002 
 (0.674) 
    -0.005 
    (0.115) 
   -0.002*** 
 (0.000) 
  -0.001 
  (0.543) 
 -0.006 
 (0.106) 
    -0.006 
   (0.267) 
     -0.001 
     (0.150) 
     -0.002 
     (0.759) 
 -0.004*** 
  (0.005) 
Insider     -0.001 
    (0.231) 
 -0.001 
 (0.392) 
    0.001 
    (0.618) 
    0.001 
   (0.764) 
   0.002 
  (0.886) 
 -0.003* 
 (0.084) 
 
 
    0.005***                   
   (0.003) 
0.002 
     (0.503) 
     -0.001  
     (0.543) 
 -0.005 
  (0.721) 
Busy     -0.011 
    (0.707) 
 -0.013 
 (0.642) 
    -0.012 
    (0.188) 
   -0.004 
   (0.184) 
  -0.014 
  (0.163) 
 -0.005 
 (0.802) 
 
 
   -0.040 
   (0.122) 
     -0.002 
     (0.675) 
     -0.009 
     (0.796) 
 -0.043** 
  (0.025) 
Duality     -0.009 
    (0.625) 
 -0.017 
 (0.367) 
    -0.001 
    (0.868) 
   -0.002 
   (0.505) 
  -0.003 
  (0.733) 
 -0.019 
 (0.198) 
 
 
    0.010 
   (0.279) 
      0.001 
     (0.244) 
      0.022 
     (0.410) 
   0.005 
  (0.175) 
Institution      0.056 
    (0.193) 
  0.069 
 (0.199) 
   -0.007 
    (0.485) 
   -0.002 
   (0.816) 
   0.065** 
  (0.027) 
  0.152*** 
 (0.003) 
 
 
   -0.009 
   (0.615) 
     -0.014 
     (0.264) 
     -0.061 
     (0.536) 
 -0.015 
  (0.761) 
Size     -0.184*** 
    (0.000) 
 -0.165*** 
 (0.000) 
     0.003* 
    (0.084) 
    0.003*** 
   (0.002) 
   0.001 
  (0.920) 
0.006 
 (0.206) 
 
 
    0.013 
   (0.260) 
      0.004 
     (0.447) 
      0.005* 
     (0.088) 
   0.020*** 
  (0.009) 
Reinsurance    
  
      
 
      0.004 
    (0.241) 
    0.002 
   (0.772) 
   0.018 
  (0.267) 
  0.133** 
 (0.027) 
 
 
    0.001 
   (0.154) 
      0.003 
     (0.764) 
      0.058 
     (0.623) 
 0.121** 
  (0.033) 
ProdHHI 
 
GeoHHI 
 
Longtail  
 
Weak 
 
Tax 
 
Coastal_state 
 
2year_Loss_Dev 
     0.213*** 
    (0.000) 
     0.455*** 
    (0.003) 
    -0.615*** 
    (0.000) 
   0.042** 
    (0.032) 
    -0.002 
    (0.719) 
   0.003 
    (0.226) 
     0.203*** 
    (0.000) 
 
  0.231*** 
 (0.001) 
  0.426*** 
 (0.001) 
 -0.593*** 
 (0.000) 
  0.045** 
 (0.029) 
 -0.007 
 (0.795) 
  0.006*** 
 (0.002) 
  0.187*** 
 (0.001) 
 
      0.007** 
    (0.012) 
    -0.020** 
    (0.010) 
    -0.032 
    (0.655) 
    0.012** 
    (0.039) 
 
    0.034*** 
   (0.000) 
   -0.002 
   (0.735) 
   -0.034*** 
 (0.000) 
  0.009* 
 (0.079) 
 
   0.016*** 
  (0.009) 
  -0.025*** 
  (0.000) 
 -0.0533 
  (0.194) 
 0.036* 
  (0.081) 
 
  0.056*** 
 (0.002) 
 -0.039*** 
 (0.000) 
 -0.065 
 (0.537) 
  0.005 
 (0.791) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    0.043 
   (0.475) 
   -0.040 
   (0.598) 
   -0.079 
   (0.148) 
   -0.065 
 (0.170) 
 
      0.002 
     (0.108) 
     -0.099*** 
     (0.000) 
     -0.037 
 (0.159) 
      0.012** 
     (0.017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      0.067 
     (0.459) 
 -0.032**                  
 (0.031) 
     -0.070 
     (0.608) 
      0.065* 
     (0.064) 
     
 
      
 
   0.013 
  (0.775) 
 -0.067*** 
  (0.001) 
 -0.038 
  (0.702) 
   0.046** 
  (0.015) 
 
 
Observations 226     228 233 235 233   235        233 235        233      235 
Adjusted R-square  0.636   0.652                     0.494     0.486 0.668 0.473         0.491                        0.501                      0.750  0.792 
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 Table 4. Regression Results of Effect of SOX on CEO Overconfidence Measures and Risk Taking 
Note: The table reports the results of two-way fixed effects regressions. See Table 1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
within-panel serial correlation. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.  
Dependent Variable:                 Reinsurance Demand                    Total Risk             Underwriting Risk         Investment Risk                   Leverage Risk 
     OC67 
     (1) 
 Net Buyer  
    (2) 
  OC67 
   (1) 
   Net Buyer  
      (2) 
   OC67 
    (1) 
Net Buyer  
     (2) 
    OC67 
     (1) 
   Net Buyer  
       (2) 
 
 
 OC67 
   (1) 
   Net Buyer  
        (2) 
 
Intercept 
 
 3.709***    
(0.000) 
         
 3.880*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 0.035** 
(0.026) 
 
  0.013** 
 (0.025) 
                                                             
 0.068*** 
(0.000) 
  0.076** 
 (0.045) 
 
   
 -0.398 
 (0.177) 
 
    -0.223*** 
    (0.008) 
 
  -1.761*** 
  (0.000) 
 
-1.362*** 
(0.000) 
OC67(1)  0.048**  
(0.026) 
    
 
 
 
-0.050*** 
(0.004) 
  -0.017*** 
(0.000) 
  
 
 -0.031 
 (0.217) 
      
 
  -0.036*** 
  (0.000) 
   
SOX  (1) 
 
SOX×OC67(1) 
 
Net Buyer(2) 
 
SOX (2) 
 
SOX ×Net Buyer(2) 
 0.039 
(0.157) 
 0.048** 
(0.022) 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 0.054** 
(0.019) 
 0.048 
(0.118) 
 0.029 
(0.318) 
 
 
-0.048** 
(0.028) 
-0.031** 
(0.018) 
 
   
 
 
 
 -0.031*** 
 (0.000) 
 -0.007 
 (0.178) 
 -0.012 
 (0.109) 
 -0.009 
(0.195) 
-0.020** 
(0.040) 
  
 
 
 
-0.052** 
 (0.020) 
-0.005 
 (0.165) 
-0.048*** 
 (0.002) 
 
 
  0.031* 
 (0.058) 
0.015** 
 (0.011) 
    
 
 
 
-0.007 
(0.179) 
 0.028 
(0.121) 
 0.014*** 
(0.010) 
  -0.012 
  (0.699) 
  -0.054** 
  (0.025) 
  
   
 
 
 
   -0.032*** 
   (0.000) 
   -0.006 
   (0.117) 
   -0.098*** 
   (0.000) 
Bsize 
 
 -0.010 
 (0.133) 
-0.007 
(0.212) 
      -0.006 
      (0.132) 
-0.002 
(0.173) 
  -0.002 
 (0.515) 
 -0.006 
 (0.144) 
   -0.004 
  (0.154) 
-0.002 
(0.135) 
      -0.003 
      (0.610) 
   -0.003*** 
   (0.005) 
Insider  -0.003 
 (0.471) 
-0.002 
(0.235) 
       0.004 
      (0.183) 
 0.002 
(0.617) 
   0.001 
 (0.801) 
 -0.003* 
 (0.064) 
 
 
   0.005 
  (0.109) 
 0.001 
(0.739) 
      -0.002 
      (0.241) 
   -0.006 
   (0.259) 
Busy  -0.026 
 (0.461) 
-0.019 
(0.312) 
      -0.013 
      (0.290) 
-0.005 
(0.385) 
  -0.016 
 (0.160) 
 -0.065** 
 (0.030) 
 
 
  -0.038 
  (0.125) 
-0.003 
(0.155) 
      -0.010 
      (0.221) 
   -0.042** 
   (0.021) 
Duality  -0.013** 
 (0.047) 
-0.016 
(0.428) 
      -0.009 
      (0.199) 
-0.001 
(0.520) 
  -0.004 
 (0.618) 
 -0.020 
 (0.163) 
 
 
   0.010 
  (0.201) 
 0.004 
(0.184) 
       0.023 
      (0.369) 
    0.004 
   (0.169) 
Institution   0.053 
 (0.179) 
 0.089 
(0.216) 
      -0.010 
      (0.207) 
-0.002 
(0.342) 
   0.079** 
 (0.023) 
  0.137*** 
 (0.007) 
 
 
  -0.006 
  (0.195) 
-0.017 
(0.120) 
      -0.058 
      (0.145) 
   -0.014 
   (0.581) 
Size  -0.190*** 
 (0.000) 
-0.175*** 
(0.000) 
       0.004** 
      (0.029) 
 0.003** 
(0.012) 
   0.010 
 (0.182) 
  0.003 
 (0.141) 
 
 
   0.013** 
  (0.012) 
 0.004 
(0.306) 
       0.007*** 
      (0.000) 
    0.032*** 
   (0.000) 
Reinsurance    
  
                 0.005 
      (0.208) 
 0.003 
(0.147) 
   0.016 
 (0.214) 
  0.134** 
 (0.023) 
 
 
   0.001 
  (0.150) 
 0.006** 
(0.035) 
       0.074 
      (0.282) 
  0.117*** 
   (0.000) 
ProdHHI 
 
GeoHHI 
 
Longtail  
 
Weak 
 
Tax 
 
Coastal_state 
 
2year_Loss_Dev 
  0.269*** 
 (0.000) 
  0.498*** 
 (0.000) 
 -0.665*** 
 (0.000) 
0.050** 
 (0.028) 
 -0.006 
 (0.302) 
0.003 
 (0.238) 
0.286*** 
 (0.001) 
 0.257*** 
(0.003) 
 0.379*** 
(0.005) 
-0.563*** 
(0.000) 
 0.046 
(0.132) 
-0.004 
(0.190) 
 0.005 
(0.143) 
 0.186*** 
(0.002) 
       0.010*** 
      (0.000) 
      -0.021** 
      (0.045) 
      -0.032 
      (0.124) 
       0.016*** 
      (0.002) 
 
 0.040** 
(0.021) 
-0.003** 
(0.034) 
-0.041** 
(0.049) 
 0.010* 
(0.086) 
 
   0.015** 
 (0.021) 
 -0.014*** 
 (0.000) 
 -0.050 
 (0.227) 
0.037* 
 (0.076) 
 
  0.089*** 
 (0.002) 
-0.024*** 
 (0.000) 
 -0.062 
 (0.556) 
  0.006 
 (0.228) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   0.046* 
  (0.069) 
  -0.034*** 
  (0.000) 
  -0.080 
  (0.110) 
  -0.067 
(0.105) 
 
 0.002 
(0.125) 
-0.090*** 
(0.000) 
-0.034 
(0.141) 
 0.0178** 
(0.014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       0.067 
      (0.184) 
      -0.043*** 
      (0.000) 
      -0.062 
      (0.215) 
       0.068 
      (0.261) 
     
      
              
    0.015 
   (0.108) 
   -0.059*** 
   (0.000) 
   -0.038 
   (0.688) 
  0.049*** 
   (0.007) 
  
  
   
  
 
Observations    226  228         233    235  233  235  233 235  233  235 
Adjusted R-square 0.671  0.635        0.490  0.474   0.669 0.696 0.501            0.477 0.672 0.605 
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Table 5. Regression Results of Financial Crisis on CEO Overconfidence Measures and Risk Taking 
Note: The table reports the results of cross-sectional regressions. See Table 1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-
panel serial correlation. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.  
Dependent Variable:      ∆ Reinsurance Demand           ∆ Total Risk      ∆ Underwriting Risk            ∆ Investment Risk          ∆ Leverage Risk 
    OC67 
     (1) 
  Net Buyer  
     (2) 
   OC67 
   (1) 
  Net Buyer  
      (2) 
   OC67 
    (1) 
Net Buyer  
   (2) 
   OC67 
    (1) 
 Net Buyer  
     (2) 
 
 
OC67 
  (1) 
  Net Buyer  
       (2) 
 
Intercept 
 
   3.174*** 
  (0.000) 
          
 2.406*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
 -0.132 
 (0.219) 
    
  -0.381 
  (0.161) 
  
 0.398 
(0.422) 
 
 0.735 
(0.171) 
 
 
   
 0.207 
(0.175) 
 
   0.043 
  (0.528) 
   
 3.002** 
 (0.048) 
 
 2.751*** 
(0.008) 
OC67(1)  0.134 
(0.115) 
    
 
 
 
 -0.019*** 
 (0.004) 
    
 
 -0.025 
(0.409) 
  
 
-0.026** 
(0.018) 
  -0.233** 
 (0.013) 
   
Net Buyer(2)    
 
  0.272 
 (0.119) 
 
 
   
 
  -0.051** 
  (0.011) 
    
 
-0.044 
(0.365) 
 
 
   
 
      -0.003 
      (0.715) 
  
 
  -0.407*** 
  (0.000) 
Bsize 
 
-0.016** 
(0.013) 
 -0.012 
 (0.207) 
      -0.004 
      (0.417) 
 -0.016 
 (0.281) 
  -0.010 
 (0.730) 
-0.030 
(0.155) 
  -0.003 
 (0.285) 
  -0.005 
  (0.304) 
     -0.027 
     (0.341) 
  -0.013 
  (0.276) 
Insider -0.007 
(0.244) 
 -0.004 
 (0.306) 
       0.009 
      (0.231) 
  0.006 
 (0.541) 
   0.006 
 (0.645) 
 0.004* 
(0.083) 
 
 
  0.008 
 (0.258) 
   0.004 
  (0.424) 
     -0.004 
     (0.584) 
  -0.011 
  (0.722) 
Busy -0.019 
(0.292) 
 -0.007 
 (0.390) 
      -0.004 
      (0.657) 
 -0.007 
 (0.255) 
  -0.047 
 (0.271) 
-0.043 
(0.344) 
 
 
 -0.013 
 (0.357) 
  -0.010 
  (0.178) 
     -0.014 
     (0.301) 
  -0.135*** 
  (0.003) 
Duality -0.047 
(0.401) 
 -0.022 
 (0.598) 
      -0.005 
      (0.572) 
 -0.019 
 (0.459) 
  -0.042 
 (0.221) 
-0.013*** 
(0.000) 
 
 
  0.009 
 (0.489) 
   0.007 
  (0.187) 
      0.108 
     (0.318) 
   0.362*** 
  (0.000) 
Institution  0.044 
(0.178) 
  0.158 
 (0.280) 
      -0.041 
      (0.126) 
 -0.016 
 (0.187) 
   0.262** 
 (0.031) 
 0.019   
(0.136) 
 
 
 -0.015*** 
 (0.000) 
  -0.012*** 
  (0.000) 
     -0.067*** 
     (0.000) 
  -0.083 
  (0.505) 
Size -0.135*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.132*** 
 (0.000) 
       0.004*** 
      (0.000) 
  0.002*** 
 (0.000) 
   0.005 
 (0.198) 
 0.028 
(0.147) 
 
 
  0.006 
 (0.174) 
   0.003 
  (0.172) 
      0.084** 
     (0.048) 
   0.017 
  (0.158) 
Reinsurance    
  
             0.005 
      (0.119) 
  0.020 
 (0.385) 
   0.036 
 (0.211) 
  0.127 
(0.158) 
 
 
  0.008 
 (0.176) 
   0.011 
  (0.305) 
      0.139 
     (0.191) 
   0.147** 
  (0.048) 
ProdHHI 
 
GeoHHI 
 
Longtail  
 
Weak 
 
Tax 
 
Coastal_state 
 
2year_Loss_Dev 
 0.463*** 
(0.004) 
 0.611** 
(0.018) 
-0.159*** 
(0.000) 
 0.047 
(0.137) 
-0.154 
(0.168) 
 0.012** 
(0.027) 
 0.392*** 
(0.000) 
  0.395*** 
 (0.000)                                              
  0.710*** 
 (0.000) 
 -0.290** 
 (0.011) 
  0.036 
 (0.206) 
 -0.156 
 (0.290) 
0.025**  
 (0.021) 
  0.260*** 
 (0.000) 
       0.027*            
  (0.097)
      -0.050*** 
      (0.007) 
      -0.093*** 
      (0.003) 
     0.007*** 
      (0.000) 
 
  0.008*** 
 (0.009) 
 -0.028 
 (0.759) 
 -0.015* 
 (0.084) 
  0.005 
 (0.178) 
 
   0.031*** 
 (0.000) 
 -0.021 
 (0.102) 
 -0.107 
 (0.464) 
0.026 
 (0.732) 
 
 0.045** 
(0.032) 
-0.083*** 
(0.000) 
-0.081 
(0.549) 
 0.028** 
(0.016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.007 
 (0.121) 
 -0.022*** 
 (0.000) 
 -0.038  
 (0.406) 
0.036** 
 (0.015) 
 
   0.019 
  (0.154) 
  -0.031 
  (0.169) 
  -0.045** 
  (0.040) 
 0.012 
  (0.798) 
  
      0.305 
     (0.198) 
     -0.131 
     (0.222) 
     -0.330 
     (0.463) 
      0.025** 
   (0.029) 
 
   0.454* 
  (0.098) 
  -0.123 
  (0.260) 
-0.437 
(0.547) 
   0.045* 
  (0.060) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observations     24      26           24     26    24   26 24  26        24                   26                  
Adjusted R-square  0.727   0.789                       0.643   0.641   0.503 0.495    0.597     0.587                        0.771   0.724 
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 Table 6. Regression Results of Firm Performance on CEO Overconfidence Measures 
  
Note: The table reports the results of two-way fixed effects regressions. See Table 1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity  
and within-panel serial correlation. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.   
 
     
Dependent Variable:                  Tobin’s Q                        ROA                   ROE             Stock Return  
      OC67 
       (1) 
  Net Buyer  
       (2) 
    OC67 
     (1) 
    Net Buyer  
        (2) 
   OC67 
    (1) 
   Net Buyer  
       (2) 
     OC67 
       (1) 
   Net Buyer  
        (2) 
 
Intercept 
 
  0.353**         
   (0.000) 
    
   0.271*** 
  (0.000) 
 
 
 
   0.059 
  (0.305) 
 
      0.110 
     (0.211) 
    
 -0.014 
 (0.714) 
 
 -0.273** 
  (0.045) 
   
  -1.124 
  (0.139) 
 
   -1.963** 
    (0.011) 
OC67(1)     0.071** 
   (0.013) 
    
 
 
 
   0.014** 
  (0.042) 
   
 
   0.035** 
 (0.043) 
    0.165** 
  (0.038) 
 
Net Buyer(2)    
 
   0.127*** 
  (0.000) 
 
 
 
 
      0.020** 
     (0.047) 
    
 
   0.072** 
  (0.040) 
      0.292*** 
    (0.001) 
Bsize 
 
   0.003 
  (0.198) 
   0.004 
  (0218) 
        0.002 
       (0.920) 
  0.001 
 (0.154) 
    0.004 
  (0.121) 
   0.002 
  (0.227) 
   -0.018** 
   (0.015) 
    -0.026*** 
    (0.000) 
Insider   -0.008** 
  (0.025) 
  -0.004 
  (0.125) 
        0.003 
       (0.184) 
  0.001 
 (0.154) 
    0.001* 
  (0.097) 
   0.008 
  (0.617) 
   -0.002 
   (0.800) 
 0.003 
    (0.160) 
Busy    0.015 
  (0.793) 
   0.126*** 
  (0.000) 
        0.004 
       (0.294) 
  0.016* 
 (0.095) 
    0.034 
  (0.142) 
   0.032 
  (0.168) 
    0.060*** 
   (0.000) 
     0.029* 
    (0.085) 
Duality    0.016     
  (0.695) 
   0.015 
  (0.199) 
        0.003 
       (0.764) 
  0.004 
 (0.187) 
    0.015 
  (0.391) 
   0.027 
  (0.240) 
    0.021* 
   (0.094) 
     0.038*** 
    (0.002) 
Institution    0.067 
  (0.634) 
   0.157** 
  (0.035) 
        0.019 
       (0.247) 
  0.019 
 (0.169) 
    0.017 
  (0.779) 
   0.108 
  (0.184) 
    0.043** 
   (0.023) 
     0.370*** 
    (0.002) 
Size    0.020** 
  (0.029) 
   0.020 
  (0.245) 
        0.002 
       (0.108) 
  0.005 
 (0.535) 
    0.006 
  (0.132) 
   0.052** 
  (0.039) 
    0.065* 
   (0.097) 
 0.064** 
    (0.046) 
Reinsurance   -0.162    
  (0.362) 
  -0.118 
  (0.178) 
       -0.010** 
       (0.024) 
 -0.064** 
 (0.023) 
   -0.037*** 
  (0.000) 
  -0.139 
  (0.148) 
   -0.191 
   (0.974) 
    -0.435 
    (0.162) 
ProdHHI 
 
GeoHHI 
 
Longtail  
 
Weak 
 
   0.054 
  (0.103) 
   0.107 
  (0.209) 
  -0.166   
  (0.428) 
 0.016    
  (0.450) 
   0.211*** 
  (0.003) 
   0.024 
  (0.852) 
  -0.004 
  (0.979) 
   0.006 
  (0.106) 
        0.014 
       (0.235) 
        0.005 
       (0.198) 
       -0.013 
       (0.426) 
       -0.037*** 
       (0.008) 
0.068***          
 (0.003) 
  0.077** 
 (0.013) 
 -0.063 
 (0.201) 
 -0.012 
 (0.223) 
    0.030** 
  (0.047) 
   0.028 
  (0.145) 
  -0.049 
  (0.567) 
  -0.013*** 
  (0.000) 
   0.307*** 
  (0.000) 
   0.273** 
  (0.041) 
  -0.188 
  (0.263) 
  -0.040 
  (0.218) 
 
    0.196*** 
   (0.004) 
    0.438* 
   (0.071) 
   -0.177 
   (0.787) 
 -0.051*** 
 (0.000) 
 0.318 
    (0.160) 
 0.115*** 
    (0.000)   
    -0.185*** 
    (0.000) 
    -0.065 
    (0.104) 
Observations 226 228       226      228   226 228 226                           228 
Adjusted R-square 0.343 0.431        0.570 0.591 0.602 0.592    0.401       0.517 
 56 
 
Table 7. Comparison of Abnormal Returns between Firms with Overconfident CEOs and non-Overconfident CEOs 
 
Note: The table presents the abnormal returns for the sample firms based on the Fama-French three-factor model (1993) and the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. 
OC CEOs and Non-OC CEOs refer to firms with overconfident CEOs and non-overconfident CEOs, respectively. In parentheses are t-statistics adjusted for serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
CEO Overconfidence   Fama-French Three-Factor Model        Carhart Four-Factor Model 
   α       b        s              h      α           b          s    h                m 
                                                                    Panel A: Option holdings-based measure 
Equal Weight  OC CEOs 
 
 0.006*** 
 (2.74) 
 
0.958*** 
(34.06) 
 
0.570** 
(2.45) 
 
-0.354*** 
(-3.05) 
 
 0.007*** 
 (2.92) 
 
0.947*** 
(34.51) 
 
0.552*** 
(3.42) 
 
-0.359*** 
(-3.85) 
 
-0.038 
(-1.35)  
 Non-OC CEOs 
 
-0.001 
 (-1.43) 
0.945*** 
(38.14) 
0.559 
(1.87) 
-0.311 
(-1.32) 
-0.002 
 (-1.65) 
0.936*** 
(38.70) 
0.509 
(1.46) 
-0.331 
(-1.46) 
-0.029 
(-0.86)  
 Difference  0.007*** 
 (2.80) 
0.013 
(1.53) 
0.011 
(1.64) 
-0.043** 
(-2.10) 
 0.009*** 
 (3.35) 
0.011 
(1.55) 
0.043*** 
(2.94) 
-0.028* 
(-1.84) 
-0.009 
(-1.45) 
Value Weight  OC CEOs  0.006*** 
 (2.95) 
0.945*** 
(31.12) 
0.612** 
(2.43) 
-0.386 
(-1.57) 
 0.008*** 
 (3.25) 
0.950*** 
(30.13) 
0.615** 
(2.43) 
-0.377** 
(-2.13) 
-0.029 
(-1.47)  
 Non-OC CEOs  0.001 
 (1.19) 
0.941*** 
(33.45) 
0.602 
(1.25) 
-0.371 
(-1.62) 
 0.001 
 (1.07) 
0.938*** 
(34.72) 
0.590*** 
(3.25) 
-0.312* 
(-1.81) 
-0.022 
(-0.85) 
  Difference  0.005** 
 (2.43) 
0.004 
(0.80) 
0.010 
(1.47) 
-0.015 
(-1.15) 
 0.007** 
 (2.57) 
0.012 
(1.64) 
0.025* 
(1.85) 
-0.065*** 
(-3.13) 
-0.007 
(-1.16) 
                                                                    Panel B: Net stock purchase-based measure 
Equal Weight  OC CEOs 
 
  0.007*** 
  (3.06) 
 
0.947*** 
(36.55) 
 
0.634** 
(2.19) 
 
-0.407** 
(-3.08)  
 
 0.007*** 
 (3.04) 
 
0.943*** 
(33.73) 
 
0.642*** 
(2.63) 
 
-0.428*** 
(-3.51) 
 
-0.103 
(-1.22)  
 Non-OC CEOs 
 
  0.001 
  (1.08) 
0.932*** 
(38.23) 
0.607 
(1.55) 
-0.399 
(-1.21) 
 0.002 
 (1.32) 
0.935*** 
(30.29) 
0.633 
(1.30) 
-0.413 
(-1.53) 
-0.098 
(-1.06)  
 Difference   0.006** 
  (2.51) 
0.015* 
(1.73) 
0.027** 
(2.07) 
-0.008 
(-0.75) 
 0.005** 
 (2.23) 
0.008 
(1.30) 
0.009 
(1.22) 
-0.015* 
(-1.70) 
-0.005 
(-1.05) 
Value Weight  OC CEOs   0.006*** 
  (3.35) 
0.949*** 
(39.20) 
0.629** 
(2.18) 
-0.424 
(-1.18) 
 0.005*** 
 (2.68) 
0.940*** 
(34.74) 
0.673*** 
(2.76) 
-0.416 
(-1.16) 
-0.106 
(-1.19)  
 Non-OC CEOs   0.001 
  (1.19) 
0.930*** 
(33.98) 
0.624 
(1.53) 
-0.421 
(-1.44) 
 0.002 
 (1.40) 
0.937*** 
(30.67) 
0.667 
(1.48) 
-0.406 
(-1.32) 
-0.094* 
(-1.95) 
  Difference   0.005** 
  (2.48) 
0.019* 
(1.80) 
0.005 
(0.88) 
-0.003 
(-0.62) 
 0.003** 
 (2.04) 
0.003 
(0.40) 
0.006 
(1.03) 
-0.010 
(-1.05) 
-0.012 
(-1.60) 
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Table 8. Comparison of Reinsurance Demand between Firms with Overconfident CEOs and non-Overconfident CEOs 
 
 
         Note: The table reports the results of the difference in the average of reinsurance demand between overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs. Average  
         of insurer’s reinsurance demand for overconfident CEOs is calculated for each five-year window, starting from the first year when they hold options at 
         least 67 percent in the money or the first year when they are net buyers of their firm’s stock. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, 
         and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reinsurance Demand  
Mean 
 
Mean 
Overconfident CEOs (OC 67) 0.249  Overconfident CEOs (OC 75) 0.277 
Non-Overconfident   CEOs  0.150  Non-Overconfident   CEOs  0.147 
Difference 
(t-statistic) 
0.099**  Difference 
 (t-statistic) 
0.130*** 
(2.33) (2.94) 
    
Overconfident CEOs (Net Buyer 50) 0.231  Overconfident CEOs (Net Buyer 80) 0.263 
Non-Overconfident   CEOs 0.149  Non-Overconfident   CEOs 0.141 
Difference 
(t-statistic) 
0.082**  Difference 
 (t-statistic) 
0.122*** 
(2.15) (2.87) 
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Table 9. Trends of CEO Option Holdings and Stock Ownership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
 
 
            
             
            
           Note: The table reports the results of the average percentage changes in option holdings and stock ownership for overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs.   
           Average percentage increase in CEO option holdings and stock ownership is computed for one-year, three-year and five-year period, beginning from the       
           first year when they hold options at least 67 percent in the money or the first year when they are net buyers of their firm’s stock.  ***, ** and * represent 
           statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively 
 
 
 
              Average Percentage Change in Option Holding                                         Average Percentage Change in Stock Ownership  
 Mean (%) 
 
Mean (%) 
One-year   (AVG t to t+1) 
 
 
 Overconfident CEOs (OC 67)  51.5  Overconfident CEOs (Net Buyer)  61.2 
 Non-Overconfident   CEOs   22.8  Non-Overconfident   CEOs   26.4 
 Difference 
 (t-statistic) 
 28.7**  Difference 
 (t-statistic) 
 34.8** 
(2.12) (2.30) 
     
Three-year (AVG t to t+3)         Overconfident CEOs (OC 67)  82.0  Overconfident CEOs (Net Buyer)   94.1 
 Non-Overconfident   CEOs   31.7  Non-Overconfident   CEOs   39.0 
 Difference 
 (t-statistic) 
 50.3***  Difference 
 (t-statistic) 
  55.1*** 
(2.81)  (2.95) 
     
Five-year   (AVG t to t+5)         
 
 Overconfident CEOs (OC 67) 123.6  Overconfident CEOs (Net Buyer)  131.7 
 Non-Overconfident   CEOs    57.2  Non-Overconfident   CEOs    61.4 
 Difference 
 (t-statistic)                        
  66.4*** 
 (3.37)                                    
 Difference 
(t-statistic) 
   70.3*** 
  (3.45) 
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Table 10.  2SLS Regression Results of Risk Taking on CEO Overconfidence Measures 
Note: The table reports the results of 2SLS regressions. See Table 1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and within-panel 
serial correlation. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.  
Dependent Variable:     Reinsurance Demand             Total Risk    Underwriting Risk         Investment Risk                Leverage Risk 
  
 
OC67 
(1) 
  Net Buyer  
     (2) 
 OC67 
 (1) 
Net Buyer  
    (2) 
 
 
  OC67 
    (1) 
Net Buyer  
     (2) 
 OC67 
  (1) 
Net Buyer  
    (2) 
 
 
OC67 
  (1) 
      Net Buyer  
           (2) 
 
Intercept 
 
    0.598***   
   (0.000) 
    
  2.060*** 
 (0.000) 
 
        0.029*** 
       (0.003) 
 
 0.037*** 
(0.008) 
 
 0.101*** 
(0.007) 
 
  0.085** 
 (0.025) 
 
 
   
    0.043***     
   (0.005) 
 
0.044***    
(0.000) 
 
    -0.762*** 
    (0.000) 
 
 -0.223*** 
 (0.003) 
OC67(1)     0.151*** 
   (0.001) 
    
 
       -0.112** 
       (0.033) 
   
 
-0.031*** 
(0.000) 
  
 
   -0.111 
   (0.267) 
      
 
    -0.005 
    (0.742) 
   
Net Buyer(2)    
 
  0.153** 
 (0.036) 
 
 
-0.066** 
(0.031) 
   
 
-0.040** 
 (0.024) 
 
 
   
 
        -0.051 
        (0.292) 
  -0.031** 
 (0.029) 
Bsize 
 
   -0.010*** 
   (0.006) 
 -0.010 
 (0.155) 
      -0.001 
      (0.886) 
-0.003 
(0.189) 
 -0.001 
 (0.631) 
 -0.005 
 (0.210) 
  -0.005 
 (0.289) 
   -0.002 
   (0.195) 
   -0.001 
   (0.703) 
 -0.011 
 (0.227) 
Insider    -0.016 
   (0.304) 
 -0.006*** 
 (0.000) 
      0.001 
      (0.184) 
 0.001*** 
(0.000) 
  0.001 
 (0.110) 
 -0.001 
 (0.267) 
 
 
  0.003               
 (0.205) 
    0.083                   
   (0.109) 
   -0.001 
   (0.784) 
 -0.002 
 (0.454) 
Busy    -0.114 
   (0.650) 
 -0.029 
 (0.407) 
      -0.010 
      (0.405) 
-0.005 
(0.433) 
 -0.002 
 (0.240) 
 -0.018 
 (0.441) 
 
 
 -0.060** 
 (0.046) 
   -0.009** 
   (0.029) 
   -0.019 
   (0.228) 
 -0.016** 
 (0.047) 
Duality    -0.098 
   (0.660) 
 -0.056 
 (0.114) 
      -0.017 
      (0.421) 
-0.018 
(0.129) 
 -0.002 
 (0.176) 
 -0.010 
 (0.706) 
 
 
  0.028 
 (0.478) 
    0.020 
   (0.143) 
    0.020** 
   (0.044) 
  0.015 
 (0.337) 
Institution     0.062 
   (0.265) 
  0.113 
 (0.254) 
     -0.141*** 
      (0.007) 
-0.023 
(0.425) 
  0.030** 
 (0.037) 
  0.281*** 
 (0.000) 
 
 
 -0.056 
 (0.437) 
   -0.077*** 
   (0.003) 
   -0.073** 
   (0.025) 
 -0.123 
 (0.159) 
Size    -0.033*** 
   (0.000) 
 -0.099 
 (0.196) 
       0.035 
      (0.199) 
 0.041** 
(0.043) 
  0.001 
 (0.505) 
  0.002 
 (0.720) 
 
 
  0.028 
 (0.195) 
    0.033 
   (0.207) 
    0.003 
   (0.630) 
  0.048** 
 (0.037) 
Reinsurance    
  
      
 
       0.052 
      (0.210) 
 0.058 
(0.142) 
  0.014 
 (0.281) 
  0.215*** 
 (0.000) 
 
 
  0.054 
 (0.276) 
    0.030 
   (0.289) 
    0.011 
   (0.660) 
0.108 
 (0.167) 
ProdHHI 
 
GeoHHI 
 
Longtail  
 
Weak 
 
Tax 
 
Coastal_state 
 
2year_Loss_Dev 
    0.690 
   (0.158) 
    0.353*** 
   (0.000) 
   -0.234 
   (0.358) 
  0.152 
   (0.655) 
   -0.416 
   (0.316) 
  0.0208 
   (0.507) 
    0.451*** 
   (0.000) 
  0.247*** 
 (0.000) 
  0.189** 
 (0.050) 
 -0.007 
 (0.186) 
  0.053 
 (0.126) 
 -0.038 
 (0.424) 
  0.048** 
 (0.025) 
  0.098** 
 (0.039) 
       0.073*** 
      (0.000) 
      -0.069** 
      (0.012) 
      -0.100 
      (0.154) 
      0.034 
      (0.118) 
 
 0.037*** 
(0.002) 
-0.031 
(0.251) 
-0.109*** 
(0.005) 
 0.006 
(0.106) 
 
  0.027 
 (0.200) 
 -0.001** 
 (0.012) 
 -0.091** 
 (0.037) 
0.019 
 (0.135) 
 
  0.172 
 (0.781) 
 -0.363*** 
 (0.000) 
 -0.065 
 (0.620) 
0.048** 
 (0.039) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  0.107 
 (0.116) 
 -0.068 
 (0.265) 
 -0.042 
 (0.657) 
 -0.004 
 (0.487) 
 
    0.034*** 
   (0.000) 
   -0.022 
   (0.217) 
   -0.038 
   (0.887) 
   -0.013 
   (0.178) 
 
    0.015 
   (0.122) 
   -0.155 
   (0.745) 
   -0.067 
   (0.253) 
    0.020 
   (0.304) 
     
 
      
 
  0.047 
 (0.274) 
 -0.099*** 
 (0.004) 
 -0.003 
 (0.787) 
  0.018 
 (0.471) 
 
 
Observations   226     228       233    235 233   235         233                         235   233            235                    
Adjusted R-square 0.432   0.549                      0.491  0.478 0.563  0.493       0.482 0.532  0.487 0.449  
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 Table 11. Regression Results of Risk Taking on CEO Overconfidence Measures (with CEO equity ownership) 
Note: The table reports the results of two-way fixed effects regressions. See Table 1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
within-panel serial correlation. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
Dependent Variable:            Reinsurance Demand                 Total Risk          Underwriting Risk                Investment Risk                      Leverage Risk 
  
 
 OC67 
 (1) 
    Net Buyer  
       (2) 
 
 
    OC67 
     (1) 
Net Buyer  
    (2) 
 
 
 OC67 
   (1) 
 Net Buyer   
    (2) 
   OC67 
   (1) 
Net Buyer  
   (2) 
 
 
OC67 
  (1) 
    Net Buyer  
       (2) 
 
Intercept 
 
       3.155***   
      (0.000) 
    
   3.221*** 
  (0.000) 
 
         0.032** 
        (0.022) 
 
   0.015*** 
  (0.000) 
 
     0.076*** 
    (0.000) 
 
 0.089*** 
 (0.000) 
   
     -0.151     
     (0.505) 
 
   -0.363**    
    (0.041) 
 
        -2.388*** 
        (0.005) 
 
-1.718*** 
(0.000) 
OC67(1)        0.057** 
      (0.012) 
    
 
        -0.045*** 
        (0.003) 
   
 
    -0.031** 
    (0.024) 
 
 
     -0.028 
     (0.450) 
      
 
        -0.043*** 
        (0.002) 
   
Net Buyer(2)    
 
   0.032** 
  (0.038) 
 
 
  -0.031*** 
  (0.000) 
   
 
 -0.054** 
 (0.013) 
   
 
    -0.006 
    (0.480) 
  -0.037*** 
 (0.000) 
CEO Ownership        -0.004** 
      (0.015) 
  -0.003*** 
  (0.007) 
        -0.005*** 
        (0.000) 
  -0.007*** 
  (0.002) 
    -0.004** 
    (0.029) 
 -0.010** 
 (0.025) 
     -0.002** 
      (0.043) 
    -0.009*** 
    (0.003) 
        -0.015*** 
         (0.000) 
 -0.012*** 
 (0.000) 
Board-related 
controls 
        YES     YES            YES      YES       YES     YES 
 
 
        YES       YES            YES     YES 
Firm-related 
controls 
        YES     YES            YES      YES       YES     YES         YES       YES 
          
            YES 
 
     YES 
Observations          226      228             233       235        233      235          233        235              233       235 
Adjusted R-square         0.647    0.681           0.499     0.492      0.683    0.495         0.504      0.537   0.805        0.839 
